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INTRODUCTION

The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any
sound that [a person] made, above the level of a very low whisper,
would be picked up by it. . . . There was of course no way of
knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment.
How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on
any individual was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they
watched everybody all the time. . . . You had to live—did live, from
habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound
1
you made was overheard, and . . . every movement scrutinized.

Nineteen eighty-four came and went without realizing the bleak
existence imagined in George Orwell’s novel, set in a world where the
terms “privacy” and “freedom” were, literally, scheduled to be erased
2
However, a survey of modern
from the common vernacular.
technology and its uses just twenty years later raises the question: was
Orwell altogether wrong, or just overzealous in his estimates of how
long it would take to erode completely our understanding of
1

GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 4 (1949).
Id. at 53 (describing the work of those compiling the “Eleventh Edition of the
Newspeak dictionary” and the ultimate goal: to make “[e]very year fewer and fewer
words, and the range of consciousness always a little smaller” until “[e]very concept
that can ever be needed will be expressed by exactly one word”); see also id. at 54
(speaking optimistically of a time “when the concept of freedom has been
abolished”).
2
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personal space and privacy? In the context of employment, an
Orwellian reality is not as fanciful as once thought, for new
developments in employee surveillance programs threaten to bring
3
us closer to the world Orwell envisioned. With the advent of Global
Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking services, employers can now
purchase technology that allows them to watch everybody all the time
and scrutinize every movement.
Other commentators have already expressed concern about
various types of employee surveillance. The alarm bells went off
when video surveillance and Internet tracking software debuted in
4
workplaces. Still, these practices, limited somewhat by a need to
show business-relatedness, have largely found acceptance in some
5
form. GPS monitoring programs, however, raise unique issues that
arguably go beyond acceptable boundaries for employee surveillance.
Because GPS tracking systems can, have, and likely will continue to
6
capture off-duty movements of employees, this form of surveillance
is more nefarious than the types of employee monitoring programs
debated elsewhere.
Moreover, in contrast to the at-work monitoring of, for example,
e-mail and Internet use, the after-hours stalking of employees bears
no relationship to productivity, trade secret theft, or harassment
prevention efforts—a few of the reasons employers have proffered to
7
justify monitoring activities in other contexts.
GPS is a prime
example of “technology [that enables] employers to gather enormous
amounts of data about employees, often far beyond what is necessary to
8
satisfy safety or productivity concerns.” Even more disconcerting, “the
3

See Eric Wieffering, Blurring of Home, Online and Work May Redraw Privacy Limits,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Feb. 13, 2000, at A1 (“‘We used to worry that Big Brother
would be the government,’ said Craig Cornish, a Colorado attorney who specializes
in worker privacy rights. ‘But Big Brother is increasingly the employer.’”).
4
See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles
Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289 (2002) (electronic
monitoring of Internet use); Stephen B. Stern & Pamela J. White, Legal Risks of
Electronic Surveillance in the Workplace, MD. B. ASS’N, Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 3 (video
surveillance).
5
Kristen Bell DeTienne & Richard D. Flint, The Boss’s Eyes and Ears: A Case Study
of Electronic Employee Monitoring and the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, 12 LAB.
LAW. 93, 93 (1996) (“Traditionally, employers in America have been allowed to
eavesdrop, videotape, tap phone lines, and search through computer files, without
employee knowledge or consent. In fact, some federal laws that prohibit wire
tapping and other forms of spying specifically exempt employers . . . .”).
6
See discussion infra Part II.D.
7
Tonianne Florentino, Privacy in the Workplace, 788 PLI/PAT. 551, 563 (2004).
8
FREDERICK S. LANE III, THE NAKED EMPLOYEE: HOW TECHNOLOGY IS
COMPROMISING WORKPLACE PRIVACY 3–4 (2003) (emphasis added).
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trends that drive technology—faster, smaller, cheaper—[will] make it
possible for larger and larger numbers of employers to gather ever9
greater amounts of personal data” by saddling their employees with
GPS tracking devices.
Location determination technologies have proliferated rapidly
in the workplace not only because of technology’s seemingly
instinctive ability to develop faster than the laws that might control
10
it, but also because federal regulations have lowered the cost of
utilizing these services. The Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) imposed a December 31, 2002 deadline on mobile phone
service providers to update their product lines to include only phones
11
capable of pinpointing a user’s location.
This translated to a
requirement that new phones function as GPS receivers.
Additionally, the regulations tasked service providers with the chore
of ensuring that ninety-five percent of their customers possess
“location-capable” phones by December 31, 2005—a deadline that is
12
rapidly approaching. Through this regulation, the FCC hopes to
provide faster and more accurate emergency service to those who
13
make 9-1-1 calls from cell phones. But with nearly every cell phone
owner toting a GPS tracking device in their pocket or purse, this
development also has unintentional benefits for the emerging
14
personnel and fleet management industry. Soon, companies will be
able to stalk the large number of people in their workforce who carry
cell phones.
Without reasonable statutory restrictions on employee tracking
techniques, workers will need to rely on existing laws and doctrines,
which this Article will expose as wholly inadequate to handle this
15
Defenseless, employees thus face the danger
emerging problem.
9

Id.; see also Otis B. Grant, Law and Perceptions: Internal Investigations and Employee
Privacy Interests in Public Sector Employment, 71 UMKC L. REV. 1, 24 (2002) (warning
that “[w]ith the advent of new technology, employee monitoring will steadily
increase as it becomes cheaper to perform”).
10
William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 91, 103 (2003) (characterizing “electronic monitoring [as] an area
where technology has outstripped the law, leaving employees largely unprotected”).
11
47 C.F.R. § 20.18(g)(1)(iv) (2004).
12
Id. § 20.18(g)(1)(v).
13
Id. § 20.18 (establishing the E-911 program); see also Laurie Thomas Lee, Can
Police Track Your Wireless Calls? Call Location Information and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 381, 381 (2003).
14
One author described the E-911 program as “[p]erhaps the single most
important thrust area for locator services.” John A. Lever, Unintended Consequences of
the Global Positioning System, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, May 6, 2004, at 217, available at
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/108563806/ABSTRACT.
15
See discussion infra Part III.
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that electronic devices will erode their personal privacy, a fear first
articulated by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in their
17
seminal work, The Right to Privacy. Once again, “[t]he intensity and
complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have
18
rendered necessary some retreat from the world . . . .”
Without
some form of legal protection for off-duty employees, however,
employers will have an unchecked ability to follow them into that
19
retreat, making note of every place an employee stops along the
way.
On the other side of the debate, GPS monitoring certainly offers
attractive benefits for employers. These devices enable companies to
provide faster service and increase productivity through better
coordination of employees who work remotely—particularly
advantageous features for employers of delivery and maintenance
20
workers. They also function as risk management tools by facilitating
faster recovery of stolen property and encouraging respect for traffic
21
rules. But when the workday ends, many of the justifications for
22
monitoring become irrelevant.
Additionally, these interests should be weighed against the
negative impact that employee surveillance tends to have on its
subjects. Monitoring “takes its toll on workers and companies in
terms of stress, fatigue, apprehension, motivation, morale, and trust;
this results in increased absenteeism, turnover, poorer management,

16

Peter J. Isajiw, Comment, Workplace Email Privacy Concerns: Balancing the Personal
Dignity of Employees with the Proprietary Interests of Employers, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 73, 74 (2001).
17
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
18
Id. at 196 (discussing how the press was, at the time “overstepping in every
direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency”).
19
The technology “rarely works anywhere but outdoors.” David A. Schumann,
Tracking Evidence with GPS Technology, WIS. LAW., May 2004, at 62 n.13. But given how
far the technology has come, this obstacle will likely be overcome in the near future.
Some reports claim that companies, including Sprint, already have technology that
“can pinpoint a phone’s location within . . . 1,000 feet if it is inside.” David Hayes,
Locator Phones: Spies or Helpers?, KAN. CITY STAR, May 16, 2005, at A1.
20
See DeTienne & Flint, supra note 5, at 95–96; see also infra note 56 and
accompanying text.
21
See discussion infra notes 60–61, 65 and accompanying text.
22
Granted, regardless of whether an employee is off-duty, other employer
interests may be furthered by after-hours monitoring when company vehicles,
vulnerable to theft or misuse, are involved. However, these concerns are not relevant
for every employer using GPS tracking devices and exceptions, like the one described
in the statutory proposal in Part V.C.3 of this Article, can protect legitimate afterhours interests in valuable employer-owned property.
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and lower productivity, not to mention higher health-care costs.” By
failing to legislate in this area and allowing employers to exercise an
absolute power to stalk employees around the clock, government
implicitly favors the employers’ interests over those of employees,
who have an equally substantial stake in how the law approaches this
issue. For example:
[E]mployment is a key source of self-esteem for many workers.
Individuals often define themselves by their occupations, which
becomes a significant aspect of their personae. Because of the
substantial interests individuals have in both employment and in
privacy, invasive monitoring puts employees in a “catch-22”
situation, forcing them to sacrifice reasonable expectations of
24
privacy because of their need to work.

The law should not enable employers to put employees in this
impossible position.
After-hours GPS monitoring takes two controversial issues in
employment law—electronic monitoring and discipline for off-duty
activity—and combines them, creating the potential for a “worst of
both worlds” situation. Legislators and courts have found reasonable
exceptions that separately allow for electronic monitoring in the
25
workplace and off-duty observations in some contexts, but off-duty
GPS tracking of employees goes beyond these tolerable limits.
Motivated by these concerns, this Article will attempt to build a
case for why and how off-duty GPS tracking of employees should be
limited by federal statute. Part II provides historical information
regarding the development of GPS technology, how it became a part
of civilian business operations, and its impact on workers thus far.
Part III explores the potential legal theories that might provide a
means for balancing employer interests in using technology that
enhances efficiency and employee interests in maintaining some
shred of privacy in a world where personal lives are increasingly less
23

Kesan, supra note 4, at 320; see also 139 CONG. REC. S6122, 6123 (1993)
(statement of Sen. Paul Simon in support of S. 984) (recalling the testimony of a
Northwest Airlines sales representative who was electronically monitored so
pervasively “that she had to get a doctor’s note to limit the amount of monitoring she
[was] to be subjected to during a work day due to the stress and health problems the
monitoring had caused”). Given these effects, one would think that employers
would recognize on their own how short-sighted the ruthless operation of an
electronic sweatshop really is; but even economic losses resulting from employee
stress have not dampened employers’ interest in gathering more information about
their employees.
24
S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring
in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 835 (1998).
25
See discussion infra Part III.B.2 and infra notes 144–45 and accompanying text.
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distinguishable from work lives. This section concludes, however,
that existing legal doctrines are imperfect vehicles for the pursuit of
an employee’s right not to be monitored after hours. Part IV
explores how the law has responded to the use of GPS devices to
monitor people in other contexts and observes that, in an
unregulated world, the rights of employees most closely resemble
those of suspected and convicted criminals, when they should instead
correspond with the rights against surreptitious monitoring that state
legislators have recently created for consumers. Part V thus seeks to
develop an acceptable proposal for a federal law governing afterhours monitoring of employees. This section explores recent failed
efforts to create generic employee privacy laws and attempts to
remedy the shortcomings of these bills by proposing a more narrow
solution targeted at one of the more egregious forms of employee
privacy violations: the constant surveillance of the off-duty activities of
employees.
II. TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND
As with other technological developments, GPS tracking systems
threaten to outpace lawmakers’ abilities to ensure that old rights are
not sacrificed in exchange for the “convenience” offered by modern
27
machinery.
Blinded by the glowing screen of each new gadget,
society generally tends to moon over efficiency gains without
considering the true cost of living in a more automated society. The
story behind the evolution of GPS monitoring technology reveals
another invention falling into this pattern, in which the modern
marvel becomes, under some circumstances, the modern menace.

26

Wieffering, supra note 3.
See LANE, supra note 8, at 185 (discussing the “persistent tension between
‘privacy’—our innate desire to control the information that is known about us—and
‘convenience’—our equally innate desire for day-to-day life to be a little easier”).
Lane offers Internet technologies, capable of remembering preferences and
payment information, as one example of the trade-off between privacy and
convenience. Id. The same technology that relieves us of having to retype personal
information for every Internet transaction also “help[s] websites track which pages
we look at and the sites we visit afterwards.” Id. Going back even further, Lane
reminds us that we also traded huge amounts of information about our shopping,
eating, and travel habits to credit card companies in exchange for the convenience
of not having to carry cash. Id. “The trading of privacy for convenience has become
so commonplace that we often don’t even think about it.” Id.
27
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A. GPS Technology and How It Works
From the beginning, the Global Positioning System was designed
to track an increasingly mobile population, although not the civilian
28
masses who are now the targets of its unblinking gaze. The military
developed the technology after the Vietnam War “to form a
29
worldwide navigational system” that could track troops on the
30
The resulting GPS infrastructure
ground in remote locations.
consisted of twenty-four primary satellites, arranged in six orbital
31
planes, and a handful of spares that now circle the earth every
32
twelve hours from a distance of about 10,900 nautical miles. At any
given time, five satellites are visible from a given point on earth,
although determining a receiver’s location requires using only three
33
to four satellites. By measuring the length of radio signals emitted
by these satellites, a receiver on earth can calculate its own location,
34
within ten to 100 meters, by “triangulating” the signals.
Additionally, “[i]f a person is mobile, a GPS receiver may calculate
35
the person’s speed and direction of travel . . . .”
28

One author has described GPS as “an asset of the U.S. Government that has
seen widespread adoption in the last decade, far beyond its original intended
purpose.” Lever, supra note 14, at 220.
29
RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., EMERGING TECHNOLOGY: FORMS & ANALYSIS § 1.03
(2003).
30
Richard C. Balough, Global Positioning System and the Internet: A Combination with
Privacy Risks, 15 CBA REC. 28, 29 (Oct. 2001).
31
The number of spares appears to fluctuate. At the start of 2003, with only two
back-ups in place, the United States launched its first new addition since 2001. Justin
Ray, Delta Rocket Launches GPS Navigation Satellite, SPACEFLIGHT NOW, Jan. 29, 2003,
http://spaceflightnow.com/delta/d295 [hereinafter Ray, Delta Rocket Launches].
Subsequently, hurricanes and other weather-related obstacles interfered with
launches in 2004. Worldwide Launch Schedule, SPACEFLIGHT NOW, http://spaceflight
now.com/tracking (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). At last count, the military had a total
of twenty-eight craft (twenty-four functioning satellites and four back-ups), in place
for navigation purposes. Justin Ray, Delta Rocket Successfully Launches One for The
Gipper, SPACEFLIGHT NOW, June 23, 2004, http://www.spaceflightnow.com/delta/
d305.
32
Balough, supra note 30, at 29; Ray, Delta Rocket Launches, supra note 31.
33
SCOTT PACE ET AL., THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: ASSESSING NATIONAL
POLICIES app. A, at 218 (1995), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/
MR614/MR614.appa.pdf.
34
Balough, supra note 30, at 29; see also David J. Phillips, Beyond Privacy:
Confronting Locational Surveillance in Wireless Communication, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 4
(2003) (explaining that “[t]riangulation calculates the user’s location by comparing
the same signal as it arrives at several receiving towers”). Depending on the number
of satellites involved in the calculation, a GPS receiver may be able to determine its
altitude in addition to its geographic position. RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., supra note
29.
35
RAYSMAN ET AL., supra note 29.
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In 1983, after the Russians shot down a disoriented Korean
Airlines flight that mistakenly entered Russian airspace, President
Ronald Reagan approved the commercial use of the military’s GPS
36
infrastructure.
At first, civilian use of the technology developed
37
slowly in niche markets such as surveying and aviation. Then, just as
the 24-satellite constellation in place today neared completion, “[t]he
success of GPS in Operation Desert Storm sparked a surge in a
growing multi-million-dollar market that had barely existed just a few
38
News coverage of “soldiers navigat[ing]
years prior to the war.”
across a featureless desert” and “bomber units target[ing] the enemy
with unprecedented accuracy” essentially provided free advertising
39
for GPS service providers.
The industry grew rapidly after these events and continues to
expand. “[S]ome analysts now predict that the burgeoning industry
40
may see annual revenues as high as $34 to $41 billion by 2006.”
Additionally, the product line continues to diversify and currently
includes services ranging from OnStar’s Neverlost system, an onboard
navigation tool that guides drivers to a user-specified destination, to
Wherify and Digital Angel’s personal tracking wristwatches, ideal
devices to use when pursuing a kidnapped toddler or rebellious
41
Despite the ever-expanding array of available services,
teenager.
36

Waseem Karim, Note, The Privacy Implications of Personal Locators: Why You
Should Think Twice Before Voluntarily Availing Yourself to GPS Monitoring, 14 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 485, 485 & n.3 (2004) (citing ALESSANDRA A.L. ANDRADE, THE GLOBAL
NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM: NAVIGATING INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM 37, 38, 53 n.6
(2001)).
37
PACE ET AL., supra note 33, app. B, at 248–49.
38
Id. at 250. Shortages of military receivers further stimulated sales of civilian
GPS products as the military had to purchase thousands of privately manufactured
devices for its operations in Iraq. To use these devices, the military also had to make
the system more accessible to civilian products, which enhanced the accuracy of
commercial GPS receivers. Id. at 250–51.
39
Id.
40
LANE, supra note 8, at 200; see also James C. White, People, Not Places: A Policy
Framework for Analyzing Location Privacy Issues 13 (Spring 2003) (unpublished
M.A. memorandum, Duke University), http://www.epic.org/privacy/location/jwhite
locationprivacy.pdf (“[B]y 2006, the worldwide market for location-based services is
expected to be almost $40 Billion.”). Contra Employee Tracking Technology Raises
Concerns About Privacy, 174 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 347 (May 10, 2004) (offering a
more conservative estimate, predicting that “[l]ocation-based services—which can be
used to monitor employee movement—will be a $15 billion industry by 2007 as a
variety of interested companies scramble to implement it in various elements of their
business operations” (quoting Cindy-Ann L. Thomas, Taft HR Solutions)).
41
Karim, supra note 36, at 488–92 (describing personal tracking devices). The
industry’s plans are not, however, limited to stand-alone tracking devices. Firms like
Applied Digital Solutions, the maker of VeriChip, have designed more invasive
devices that are “surgically imbedded underneath a person’s skin,” id. at 490–92,
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however, this Article focuses exclusively on one segment of the
market: the fleet and personnel management tools that,
unbeknownst to many employees, are already in place, monitoring a
worker’s every move. The next section describes these tools and
services and the companies that deploy them.
B. Packages Offered for Employee Monitoring and the Companies That
Use Them
As previously noted, employers do have compelling reasons for
42
using GPS tracking systems to monitor a mobile workforce. Many
fleet management programs tout their ability to prevent theft of
company assets, verify employee productivity, and reduce insurance
premiums by providing carriers with evidence that drivers comply
with traffic laws. These companies offer a variety of tracking options,
ranging from “active” systems that report location data at regular
intervals, to “passive” devices that log downloadable tracking
information. Thus, when choosing a system, employers must weigh
their interests in having such services and business needs against cost
43
and system complexity. The following provides a sampling of the
specific services these tracking companies offer.
One example of a workforce monitoring program is Aligo’s
WorkTrack, an active, real-time system that allows employers to
44
monitor time and location information via the Internet. Like many
systems, Aligo promotes itself as “an easy, accurate way to manage the
time of your mobile employees, raising productivity and bringing

causing some to speculate “that it is only a matter of time until people are routinely
‘scanned like a box of Wheaties.’” Marren Sanders, Chipping: Could a High Tech Dog
Tag Find Future American MIAs?, 4 J. HIGH TECH. L. 209, 211 (2002) (citation omitted).
Indeed, the FDA’s recent approval of VeriChip implants moved the United States
one step closer to this reality. FDA OKS Implanted Medical Info Chip, CNN, Oct. 13,
2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/10/13/fda.implant.chip.ap/index.
html. But cf. Barnaby J. Feder & Tom Zeller, Jr., Identity Chip Planted Under Skin
Approved for Use in Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004, at A1 (reporting that
although Applied Digital Solutions hopes that the VeriChip’s approved medical use
will “accelerate the acceptance of under-the-skin ID chips as security and accesscontrol devices,” the chips do not currently have “the ability to track individuals via
satellite”).
42
See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
43
ERETAILNEWS, ERETAILREPORT: GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS FOR RETAIL FLEET
MANAGEMENT 6 (2001), http://www.eretailnews.com/issues/2001-7.PDF. Hybrid
active/passive systems are also available, as well as systems that use another set of
satellites for two-way communication. Id. at 3.
44
Aligo – The Mobile Enterprise Software Company, WorkTrack, http://www.
aligo.com/products/workTrack (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
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substantial cost savings to your business.”
However, unlike other
products that merely track movements of an employer’s equipment,
such as a company car, Aligo monitors employees using “the GPS46
enabled phones they already carry . . . .”
This technology is troublesome for two reasons. First, cell
phone tracking systems, based on hand held devices, allow employers
to monitor not only their equipment, but, more specifically, the
people who carry it. Although Aligo has an “on break” mode, the
marketing materials suggest that this feature exists for the employer’s
benefit, not the employee’s. This function allows the employer to
record time more accurately—the materials say nothing about
whether the employee can use this feature to prevent his employer
from hunting him down when he is “on break,” or even off the job
47
entirely, if the device is turned off. Devices that continue to relay
location information after an employee clocks out give employers
control, or at least influence, over an employee’s uncompensated
time and invite overbearing invasions of privacy. Second, assuming
that the device can be tracked after-hours and while off, an employer
might discipline an employee for someone else’s extracurricular
activity. No feature offers confirmation that the device remained in
the employee’s possession at all times.
The system offered by Comet Tracker is only slightly less
invasive. As a phone-based system, it has the potential, like Aligo’s
WorkTrack, to mistakenly attribute the location of a misplaced phone
to the employee responsible for it. The system does, however, have

45

Id.
Id.
47
Id. Given that the devices can be used to “[a]lert[] the central office of status
and availability to take new jobs” and “[d]isplay[] a current map with the location of
your entire workforce,” the technology appears to track workers both on and off the
job. Id. Even more disconcerting for the employees, Aligo promises “continuous
access, regardless of connectivity.” Id. This statement seems to give more credence
to the assumption that the products can function as homing devices even when
turned off. See also NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., ON YOUR TRACKS: GPS TRACKING IN THE
WORKPLACE 11 (2004), http://www.workrights.org/issue_electronic/NWI_GPS_
Report.pdf (“[I]n some cases, even when the devices appear to be turned off, they
still emit detectable signals.”); Stacy A. Teicher, It’s 2 a.m. Do You Know Where Your
Workers Are?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 22, 2003, available at http://www.
csmonitor.com/2003/1222/p14s02-wmgn.html (speaking generally of GPS tracking
devices embedded in cell phones and noting that “[i]n some cases, even when the
devices appear to be turned off, they still emit signals that can be detected”).
Perhaps most frightening, however, is Aligo’s promise to enable employers to
“[a]lways know where [their] employees are.” Aligo – The Mobile Enterprise Software
Company, WorkTrack, http://www.aligo.com/products/workTrack (emphasis
added) (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
46
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an automatic shut off feature that prevents after-hours tracking. In
49
exchange for this “protection” though, employees monitored using
Comet Tracker must operate within a “geofence”—a predefined area
50
that, when breached, will trigger an alert. Again, this technology
puts the worker who takes an innocent detour to avoid traffic or road
construction at an incredible disadvantage as he or she might be fired
51
for venturing out of the employer’s virtual cage. Employers may be
interested in “always know[ing] exactly where [their] workers are—
52
and where they’ve been,” but do they really need such far-reaching
power over their employees—especially after-hours?
Employees might feel slightly less threatened by FleetBoss Global
Positioning Solutions’ fleet management services.
Using GPS
tracking devices, FleetBoss monitors vehicles, not people, although
this might be of little consequence to the employee who stops to run
an errand on the way home in the company car and unintentionally
reveals information about her personal life to her employer.
FleetBoss might discourage employees from “going home, . . . to Wal53
Mart and [to] the grocery store on company time,” but what
happens when an employer virtually observes the employee stopping
during her lunch hour at Planned Parenthood and fires her based on
48

Comet Tracker Overview, available at http://www.comettracker.com/
overview.html (describing the features of Comet Tracker, the company’s brochure
claims to offer employers the ability to “[a]lert workers to start tracking” and
“[a]utomatically stop tracking at the end of the day” (emphasis added)). Although
the program appears to place all control over the timing and duration of monitoring
in the hands of the employer, at least the system offers a technically feasible cloaking
capability.
49
The Author remains skeptical that the physical ability to turn off the phone
can offer employees much relief given that the employer is likely to assume the worst
if an employee decides to shield her activities from observation. See LANE, supra note
8, at 207 (“If a constant stream of location data is the norm in your workplace, then
information gaps are going to be suspicious. Sometimes, the absence of data can be
just as problematic as reams of it.”).
50
Comet Tracker, available at http://www.actsoft.com/products/tracker.html
(describing communication features capable of “[a]utomati[cally] email[ing] an
alert when workers . . . travel outside their set home areas”).
51
See Ben Charny, Big Boss Is Watching, C|NET NEWS.COM, Sept. 24, 2004,
http://news.com.com/Big+boss+is+watching/2100-1036_3-5379953.html (describing
Xora’s “‘geofences’ technology that sets off an alarm at the office when field workers
go to preprogrammed off-limits sites, such as a bar or a park”); Charny, supra
(“‘There’s no electro shock—yet,’ Xora CEO Sanjay Shirole said.”).
52
Comet Tracker, How Do You Track Your Workers? (2003), http://www.
comettracker.com/nextel/docs/CometTrackerFlyer.pdf.
53
FleetBoss Global Positioning Solutions, Fleet Management – Business Needs
Survey, http://www.fleetboss.com/needssurvey.asp (follow “Overtime Tip”
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 26, 2005) (quoting ServiceMaster, Lakeland, FL, a
satisfied FleetBoss customer).
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assumptions about her position on family planning methods? Even
programs that only monitor vehicles can threaten to restrict the
activities of mobile employees while they are on breaks or off-duty
and not being compensated by their employer. In fact, after-hours
control over workers in part motivated at least one FleetBoss
55
customer, Mr. Rooter Plumbing, to subscribe to FleetBoss’ services.
This discussion describes just a few of the many service providers
clamoring for a piece of this emerging market. Employers already
using these services include Orkin Pest Control (FleetBoss), Sun
Microsystems
(WorkTrack),
and
Lucent
Technologies
56
Customers are often companies that, like those
(WorkTrack).
mentioned, have a deployable service-providing workforce. The
tracking services, however, might appeal to any employer that desires
more control over the productivity of largely unsupervised
employees. Corporate lawyers, already equipped with the industry’s
standard issue BlackBerry, might some day find themselves subject to
57
similar tracking programs.
C. The Business Case for Using GPS to Monitor Employees and
Equipment
Although the discussion in Part II.B described GPS monitoring
systems as somewhat sinister and suspect, a fair discussion of these
programs must recognize the legitimate business objectives achieved
using monitoring services. Generally, an employer’s interest in
tracking its mobile workforce will stem from either an interest in
54

LANE, supra note 8, at 200 (“What if you stop at Planned Parenthood on your
lunch break and your supervisor wants to know if you’re pregnant?”).
55
FleetBoss Global Positioning Solutions, Fleet Management Testimonials: Rob
Birnie of Mr. Rooter Plumbing, http://www.fleetboss.com/testimonials.asp?REFERE
NCE_ID=53 (last visited Sept. 26, 2005) (describing one customer’s requirements:
“Drivers take trucks home, so after hours monitoring was needed”).
56
FleetBoss Global Positioning Solutions, Fleet Management Testimonials,
http://www.fleetboss.com/testimonials.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2005); Aligo Inc.,
Aligo Customers, http://www.aligo.com/customers/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
Comet Tracker does not provide a list of customers.
57
Research In Motion’s (“RIM”) BlackBerry is a wireless e-mail device, phone,
and electronic organizer all rolled into one. The company claims that over eighty
percent of AmLaw 200 firms use its products to make the lives of mobile attorneys
more manageable. BlackBerry.com, BlackBerry for the Legal Community, http://www.
blackberry.com/solutions/industry/legal/index.shtml?CPID=ILC-hllegal (last visited
Sept. 26, 2005). But the reverse may also be true—equipped with a GPS receiver in
accordance with new FCC regulations, see supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text,
the BlackBerry could be used to manage the attorneys themselves, not just their
schedules. The invasion of privacy may be staged by employers of every stripe—not
just those who manage delivery services.
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limiting employer liability or in maintaining effective business
58
This section will explain each of these
operations (or both).
categories in turn.
First, concern about liability for employee torts and work-related
injuries can justify an employer’s interest in monitoring how
employees perform away from the office. “If employees were solely
responsible for their own actions, the need for surveillance would be
greatly reduced . . . . [But] the doctrine of respondeat superior—
which provides that an employer is liable for the negligence of an
59
employee—has become an integral part of our legal system.” As the
GPS service providers point out, the ability to monitor and discipline
employees for speeding can significantly reduce employer liability for
60
Moreover, “[i]nsurers will
accidents and other traffic violations.
likely reward employers that monitor employees with lower rates,
because GPS information will help predict and control risk, and
confirm legitimate claims for early payment,” thus providing
61
employers with still more incentives to monitor speed. Finally, in
the event that a worker is injured in the field, the ability to quickly
pinpoint his location and provide medical assistance may reduce the
62
extent of his injuries and resulting workers’ compensation costs.
Employers do not enjoy less responsibility for providing a safe
58

Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not at Work?: Limiting the
Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 625, 628 (2004).
59
LANE, supra note 8, at 187. Lane explains that “[t]he theory behind the
doctrine is that employers have the ability to control the actions of their employees,
through both training and company policy, and therefore are liable for the injuries
that their employees cause within the scope of their duties.” Id. But Lane also notes,
perhaps cynically, that “[t]he practical motivation is that the employer generally has
greater resources (or can afford more insurance) and is therefore in a better
position to compensate the injured party.” Id.
60
See Xora, Industry Solutions Brief: Transportation & Distribution, http://www.
xora.com/timetrack/documents/pdf/LQ/Industry_Solutions_Transportation.pdf
(monitoring an employee’s speed “helps to ensure the safety of a company’s driver
staff as well as other motorists, while protecting the customers’ shipments”).
61
Schumann, supra note 19, at 61; Xora, supra note 60 (promoting Xora’s GPS
TimeTrack product by claiming that “if the drivers have better driving records,
companies can keep insurance costs down”).
62
Kesan, supra note 4, at 318 (“Monitoring is key to some safety initiatives and
better safety means lower insurance premiums and workers’ compensation payouts.”). Interestingly, despite the enhanced personal safety offered by GPS
monitoring systems, even those employed in one of the most dangerous mobile
professions—police officers—would rather risk being alone and injured if the
alternative is invasive surveillance. See Geoffrey James, Can’t Hide Your Prying Eyes,
COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 1, 2004, http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2004/
0,4814,90518,00.html (describing the Orlando Police Department’s failed attempt to
pilot an officer surveillance program).
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working environment simply because their employees are not in the
workplace, and GPS surveillance offers one way to better manage this
potential liability.
Second, GPS systems can significantly improve the efficiency of
an employer’s fleet management practices by helping to identify
63
64
unproductive employees, eliminate wasteful service routes, and
65
Services such as
recover stolen property—especially vehicles.
FleetBoss can significantly lower fuel costs by helping employers
66
control vehicle idling and speeding, which uses fuel inefficiently.
More dynamic routing plans can further reduce fuel costs, in
addition to providing better customer service, by allowing employers
67
to deploy the nearest available service person with very little notice.
Employers are not just interested in monitoring employees for
sport—GPS tracking of mobile employees offers substantial savings.
D. How GPS Monitoring Has Impacted Employees
On the other hand, the substantial benefits that GPS tracking
systems offer come at a cost. Scores of news stories document how
GPS monitoring has disrupted the lives of numerous employees who
live in fear of being dismissed for innocuous behavior that a
68
monitoring system might distort into something more suspicious.
63

Schumann, supra note 19, at 61 (“GPS information will disclose employee
abuses, such as alcohol consumption while working, deviations from routes . . . , and
general shirking, and result in greater productivity.”).
64
Christopher Sherman, Polk Keeping an Eye on the Wheels When Workers Drive the
County, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 24, 2004, at H1 (explaining that technology can
help employers “find[] the closest vehicle to a particular address” and provide better
customer service).
65
Sue Darcy, Employers’ Use of GPS Units Stirs Employee Privacy Concerns, 175 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 212 (Aug. 30, 2004).
66
One customer in particular, Orkin Pest Control in Atlanta, Georgia, claimed
that FleetBoss helped the business save $50,000 a month on fuel costs. FleetBoss
Global Positioning Solutions, Fleet Management Testimonials: Don King, http://
www.fleetboss.com/testimonials.asp?REFERENCE_ID=1; see also GPS Fleet Solutions,
CHECKMate High Resolution System, http://www.gpsfleetsolutions.com/pdfs/
overviews/CHECKmate%20Presentation.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2005) (noting that
“[r]esearch indicate[s] that each mile per hour above 50 MPH increases fuel
consumption by 1.5%”).
67
FleetBoss Global Positioning Solutions, Unleashing Your Full Business
Potential, http://www.fleetboss.com/oursolutions.asp (last visited September 26,
2005).
68
Although research for this Article uncovered a few examples of GPS-related
legal authority, discussed infra notes 75–81, “much of the evidence regarding the
breadth of GPS technology use by employers and abuse of the technology is
anecdotal.” Use of GPS Technology Growing, But Privacy Concerns Are Voiced, 176 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 15 (Analysis/News and Background Information) (2004). Only five
percent of companies recently surveyed by the American Management Association
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For example, snowplow operators in Massachusetts rallied on the
capitol steps and stormed a legislative hearing in Boston to protest a
70
new requirement that they carry GPS enabled phones. In addition
to their fears that the state would use surveillance data to challenge
their time sheet entries, the plowers expressed concern that the
technology might misinterpret idling in a traffic jam as sleeping on
71
the job. Data collected through positioning systems tells only half of
the story. It provides only the “where and when” not the “why,” and
as the snowplowers suggested, employers might fire workers based on
an assumed, perhaps inaccurate, explanation for why an employee
72
was at a particular place for a given amount of time.
Examples of discipline based on assumptions drawn from
positioning data can be found in the news and in court filings. In
Dallas, the owner of a car alarm installation company fired an
employee after discovering, through use of a wireless tracking device,
that the employee’s vehicle was in the parking lot of the Million
73
74
Dollar Saloon (a strip club). And in In re Superior Products Inc., a
company fired an employee when it determined, using GPS tracking
data, that his late deliveries resulted, at least in part, from his failure

stated that “they use GPS technology to track company cell phones.” Study Concludes
Most Employers Monitor Employee Internet Usage, 177 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 138
(Analysis/News and Background Information) (2005). Lewis Maltby, president of
the National Workrights Institute, concedes that “GPS use by employers is not a huge
problem today,” but warns that “it has the potential to become a huge problem.” Use
of GPS Technology Growing, But Privacy Concerns Are Voiced, supra.
69
Note that the plowers, as state employees, could have raised objections to
surveillance practices that would not apply in the context of private employment. See
LANE, supra note 8, at 11 (“If your employer is a government body, agency, or
department, then generally speaking, the protections of the Constitution (and
particularly the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable search and
seizure) do apply to you.”). However, an employee’s discomfort with GPS
surveillance and her reaction to her employer’s threat to use such technology is not
necessarily tempered by her legal options. As the anecdotes presented in Part II.D
demonstrate, public and private employees alike chafe at the thought of being
tagged and tracked. For this reason, the personal stories of both public and private
employees are relevant to this discussion.
70
Charles Forelle, On the Road Again, But Now the Boss Is Sitting Beside You, WALL
ST. J., May 14, 2004, at A1.
71
Id.
72
See infra note 77 (discussing Senator John Edwards’ concerns about how GPS
tracking data can be misinterpreted).
73
Simon Romero, Location Devices’ Use Rises, Prompting Privacy Concerns, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001, § 1, at 1. Romero does not reveal whether the employee actually
patronized the gentleman’s club or merely happened to leave his vehicle in the
vicinity of that establishment. Id.
74
116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1623 (2002).
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75

to take the most direct routes. The company refused to credit the
employee’s explanation for the detours: his supervisor owed him
$87.32 in toll reimbursements and he could not afford to front
76
When employers jump to
additional toll costs for his employer.
conclusions about the on- and off-duty whereabouts of their
employees, workers like those in these examples face harsh
77
repercussions for what may be justifiable behavior.
Discipline based on monitoring strictly off-duty conduct
unrelated to theft or misuse of the employer’s property, the focus of
this Article, provides perhaps the most troubling evidence of
employers’ abuse of GPS services. Such actions are not only
unjustifiably intrusive, but, as the situation in Preferred Transportation,
78
Inc. demonstrates, can also be used to mask an employer’s illegal
reasons for firing an employee. In Preferred Transportation, an
employer terminated an employee for picking up extra passengers
79
when the dispatcher ignored his calls for approval and for spending
75

Id.
Id. at 1625.
77
As previously suggested, supra text accompanying note 73, the data gathered
using GPS monitoring applications encourages employers to assume the worst about
their employees. When introducing the Location Privacy Protection Act, a bill aimed
at restricting how companies use GPS technology to interact with their customers, see
infra note 194, Senator John Edwards noted that “[l]ocation information is very
private, sensitive information that can be misused . . . to draw inaccurate or
embarrassing inferences about [people].” 147 CONG. REC. S7497 (2001). In some
instances, GPS tracking systems are a blunt tool for discerning what an employee is
doing. For example, what if the auto alarm employee, see supra note 73 and
accompanying text, chose the Million Dollar Saloon parking space because the lot at
a nearby grocery store was full? This hardly justifies termination.
Furthermore, technology can malfunction and place an employee in a location
she never visited. For example, one former BellSouth worker claims to have been
discharged after the GPS system installed in his truck reported that the vehicle
remained stationary for half a day, although written statements attested to his
presence at various appointments. Adventures in Blacksburg, http://www.jazybones.
com/archives/000296.php (Mar. 1, 2002, 12:16 a.m.). The same system also
reported that the employee “drove to three jobs without ever starting the engine.”
Id. Admittedly, these are the claims of a disgruntled ex-employee; however, we have
all experienced enough internet outages and losses of cell phone service to know
that modern technology is not foolproof.
78
No. 21-CA-33407, 2003 NLRB LEXIS 236 (May 14, 2003) (decision of the
administrative law judge reproduced in full at *20).
79
Id. The case involved an airport shuttle service. Id. While driving more than
one loop around the airport without permission, as the employee had done,
technically violated policy, the discharged employee and a general manager testified
that a second loop was generally acceptable under certain circumstances. Id.
Moreover, the company abolished these restrictions shortly after firing the employee.
Id. at *31, *33. Additionally, the judge dismissed the fact that the employee made
more than three stops, another policy violation, as pretext for his termination
76
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his entire lunch break at Home Depot and not, as the employee
80
reported when asked, at Boston Market and then Home Depot.
Further inquiry revealed, however, that the employee was fired for his
union activities, not, as alleged, for his inaccurate account of his
81
whereabouts while off the company clock.
Several commentators feel that these early examples of
employees wronged by GPS tracking systems are a harbinger of a new
breed of wrongful employment practices. Drawing upon examples of
innocent after-work activities that have cost people their jobs in the
past, these authors describe how GPS tracking systems would enable
employers to ascertain covertly what employees do away from the
office, thus stripping them of control over the personal information
they once chose whether or not to reveal at work. One author
describes how an employee’s regular stops at an AIDS clinic after
work, discovered by his employer through GPS tracking technologies,
82
might trigger dismissal. Another wonders: “[W]hat if your employer
decides to lay you off because you stop at McDonald’s for lunch two
days out of three and there’s concern that the cost of providing you
health insurance and medical care will be increased by your
83
weight?” Additionally, these authors predict that the situation will
only get worse because “[i]ncreasingly[,] . . . the tools employers are
using to gather legitimate information about how [employees are]

because although “three or four drivers per week similarly violated the policy” the
company had not disciplined anyone for such violations in the previous year. Id. at
*36 (emphasis added).
80
Id. at *39–42.
81
Id. at *2. The driver involved was not a model employee. Id. The court held,
however, that the discrepancies between his story and the GPS data recorded were
part of a scheme designed solely “as a means to entrap him” in retribution for his
protected union activities. Id. at *9.
82
Aaron Renenger, Satellite Tracking and the Right to Privacy, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 549,
557 (2002). The facts of this scenario are likely based on those in Brunner v. Al Attar,
786 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). In Brunner, an employer fired an employee
who revealed that she spent her Saturdays, Sundays, and evenings volunteering with
the AIDS Foundation. He feared that her activities would “place himself, his family,
and the office workers in jeopardy.” Id. at 784–85; see also infra text accompanying
note 97.
83
LANE, supra note 8, at 200. The ACLU’s study on lifestyle discrimination may
have inspired Lane’s example. The report notes that, driven by economics,
employers have, in the past, attempted to “broaden[] the sphere of their control to
include what employees do in their own homes,” by “refus[ing] to hire people who
drink, have high cholesterol levels, or ride motorcycles.” American Civil Liberties
Union, Legislative Briefing Kit: Lifestyle Discrimination (Dec. 31, 1998), http://www.
aclu.org/WorkplaceRights/WorkplaceRights.cfm?ID=9080&c=34.
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doing [their] job[s] are also being used to track how [they] spend
84
[their] personal time.”
In response, employees have taken some steps to curb abusive
GPS monitoring.
Notably, UPS employees, aligned with the
Teamster’s Union, negotiated a clause in their collective bargaining
agreement that places some limits on the company’s use of
information obtained via GPS receivers that are attached to trucks
and scheduled to be embedded in job-related portable electronic
85
devices. Likewise, the snowplowers discussed in this section secured
concessions from the state and agreed to carry GPS-enabled phones
as long as they were paid based on their manually submitted time
86
But for the many non-unionized, private employees out
sheets.
87
there, these bargaining solutions are not feasible. Mere promises by
employers not to discipline employees based on information
gathered through electronic monitoring are not always binding in
88
the private employment at-will context, and consequently these
84

LANE, supra note 8, at 187.
National Master United Parcel Service Agreement, art. 37, § 1(d) (2002),
http://www.browncafe.net/public/upsnma (collective bargaining agreement
between UPS and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, effective August 1,
2002 through July 31, 2008, providing that “[n]o employee shall be disciplined for
exceeding personal time based on data retrieved from the DIAD/IVIS [Delivery
Information Acquisition Device] or other information technology”). The agreement
also requires that “the Employer shall not in any way intimidate . . . or overly
supervise any employee in the performance of his or her duties.” Id. art. 37, § 1(a).
One might assume that protection from excessive supervision would extend to offduty conduct if it is prohibited during the workday, although the agreement does not
specify this. See also RECORDS MGMT. ASS’N OF AUSTRALASIA, TECHNOLOGY ISSUES
REPORT: OCTOBER 2004, http://www.rmaa.com.au/docs/branches/nsw/pub/TISre
port/2004/TIS200410.pdf (reporting that 500 Chicago city employees worked
through their unions to secure concessions “allowing workers to shut down geotracking features during lunch time and after hours”).
86
Forelle, supra note 70.
87
James, supra note 62 (“Although unionized employees . . . can fight the
monitoring technologies, nonunion personnel have no legal recourse in the U.S.,
according to James T. Bennett, a professor at George Mason University who studies
workplace privacy.”); see also Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Thomas Kochan, Taking
Stock: Collective Bargaining at the Turn of the Century, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 3
(Oct. 2004) (“Union membership in the private sector has fallen to below 9%—
essentially pre-New Deal levels.”); Transport Workers Union Local 562, United We
Win: A Discussion of the Crisis Facing Workers and the Labor Movement (Feb.
2003), http://www.twu562.org/unitedwewin.html (noting that only nine percent of
the private workforce in the United States is unionized).
88
See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 98, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(allowing company to renege on its promise to workers to keep e-mail
communications confidential and privileged, and holding that, in spite of this
promise, the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable). In the context of
location monitoring, unofficial reports of broken promises not to use GPS tracking
85
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employees have few options for recourse when their employers pry
into their private lives. Part III will further explore how existing legal
protections fail to set reasonable limits on private employers who use
GPS monitoring technologies.
III. EXISTING OFF-DUTY EMPLOYEE PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC
MONITORING LEGAL DOCTRINES
Based on a survey of cases involving employers’ investigations of
employee off-duty conduct, one treatise concludes that “[g]enerally,
an employer appears to have a right . . . to investigate employee offduty conduct [when it relates to] a business interest of the
89
employer . . . .” Because the law has come to expect that employers
will protect their “employees . . . and the public from wrongdoing by
employees,” courts have recognized a nexus between employers’
business interests and employees’ drug use, sexual activities, and
90
other behavior away from the office. As a result, these interests have
justified “a variety of [investigative] techniques [including]
surveillance, wiretapping, interviews, polygraphs, and medical
91
examinations.” In addition to this right to investigate and punish
business-related, after-hours conduct, very little restrains employers
from discharging employees at-will for activities that the employer
finds repugnant and serendipitously learns about via office banter. If
these methods of investigation and the resulting consequences are
currently lawful employment practices, then we have little reason to
devices to discipline employees already exist. ABC affiliate WJLA-TV installed GPS
tracking devices “to dispatch crews quickly to breaking news, not to spy on them
when they are on the road;” however, “[s]ources in the newsroom [reported that] at
least two staffers [were] disciplined for using a company car for personal use or for
speeding in a company car.” Chris Baker, Channel 7 Uses GPS to Dispatch its Crews,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2003, at C11. “‘We all understand we can’t take the company
car to go to Ocean City for the weekend. But is it OK to pick up milk or pizza on the
way home? All of these things were never questioned before we got the GPS system,’
one photographer said.” Id.
89
1 WILLIAM E. HARTSFIELD, INVESTIGATING EMPLOYEE CONDUCT § 7:15 (2004).
90
Id. (citing, among others, Smith v. Zero Defects, Inc., 980 P.2d 545, 549–50
(Idaho 1999) (recognizing an employer’s interest in off-duty alcohol consumption by
employees, which allegedly threatened the employer’s reputation, increased
absenteeism, and hurt productivity); Hougum v. Valley Mem’l Homes, 574 N.W.2d
812, 814–15, 822 (N.D. 1998) (holding that whether an ordained minister’s act of
masturbating in a public restroom would negatively impact his “pastoral relationship”
with the residents of an assisted living facility was a question of fact preventing
summary judgment); French v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 128, 130–31
(D. Mass. 1998) (recognizing an employer’s interest in an off-site, drunken,
emotional outburst because this behavior called into question the soundness of a
supervisory employee’s judgment)).
91
HARTSFIELD, supra note 89, § 7:15.
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expect that plaintiffs will fare any better in cases challenging
dismissals or discipline based on GPS data.
A. The Employer’s Existing Dominion over Off-Duty Conduct
The law’s permissive approach to employers’ inquiries into
employees’ personal lives leaves workers with few defenses against the
employer’s intrusive gaze.
In a world where most private
employment is at-will, meaning that either the employee or the
employer can terminate the relationship “at any time . . . for any
92
reason or no reason at all,” many employees mistakenly believe,
perhaps because of their faith in the Constitution, that they have
some right to privacy. What these innocents fail to recognize is that
“every single day, tens of millions of us spend hours in offices,
cubicles, kitchens, laundry rooms, and work sites where the U.S.
93
Constitution is completely inapplicable.” Private employers are not
bound by constitutional provisions like the Fourth Amendment’s
Search and Seizure Clause, which limits intrusions by government
94
95
employers. Admittedly, anti-discrimination laws, which effectively
require even private employers to adhere to the Equal Protection
demands of the Fourteenth Amendment, introduce a fragment of
constitutional law into the private workplace. However, most of these
protections, except perhaps the protections that guard against
92

Jason P. Lemons, Comment, For Any Reason or No Reason at All: Reconciling
Employment at Will with the Rights of Texas Workers After Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc.
v. Solomon, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 741, 743 (citing John D. Blackburn, Restricted Employer
Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment at Will, 17 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 467
(1980)). The original rule, a departure from the practice in England, debuted in
Horace Gay Wood’s much debated piece entitled Master and Servant in 1877. STEVEN
L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 79, 81 (3d ed. 2002).
93
LANE, supra note 8, at 10.
94
This Article does not address how GPS tracking might be limited in the
context of public employment and often assumes that public employees would fare
better than private employees under current legal conditions, given the
Constitutional restraints placed on the government’s ability to invade privacy.
However, the Oregon Supreme Court cast doubt on this theory when it upheld the
use of GPS technology to track the employer-provided vehicle of a United States
Forest Service employee. State v. Meredith, 96 P.3d 342, 346 (Or. 2004) (holding
that under the search and seizure clause of the state constitution “defendant did not
have a protected privacy interest in keeping her location and work-related activities
concealed from . . . observation by her employer [conducted using a GPS]
transmitter”). The government might be just as free to use GPS tracking technologies
as private employers. See also infra Part IV.A (discussing government’s use of GPS
technology to track criminal suspects and parolees).
95
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000) (Title VII, covering discrimination
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213
(2000) (Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)).
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religious discrimination, get at traits (race, gender, age) and not
activities—unless the plaintiff can make some connection between,
for example, race and a particular after-hours pursuit. Consequently,
going to work each day for a private employer “is, essentially, the
96
equivalent of traveling each day to a foreign nation” where the
rights we often take for granted largely do not apply.
Although restrained in narrow circumstances by tort principles
and statutory exceptions that will be explored in detail in Part III.B,
the employment-at-will doctrine gives private employers free reign to
fire employees for a seemingly limitless number of reasons that
include displeasure with how an employee spends her off-duty hours.
For example, employers have fired or not hired workers for providing
97
volunteer service at an AIDS clinic, for attending law school at
98
99
night, and for being smokers. Recently, an employer fired a case
manager with thirteen years of commendable service “because of her
membership in Women’s Garden Circle, an investment group [her
100
Already
employer] believed to be an illegal pyramid scheme.”
empowered with a right to fire employees for activities voluntarily
revealed, GPS tracking services will enable employers to discover
covertly an employee’s outside interests and use these extracurriculars
against him or her. While employees with a “just cause” clause in
their contracts can challenge being fired for any reason, because
employers must “demonstrate that the employee’s off-duty
101
misconduct . . . has the potential to adversely affect the business,”
the standard at-will employee does not have this guarantee. In
general, even the exceptions to the formidable at-will-employment
doctrine are unlikely to provide any shelter from the boss’ prying
eyes. Still, an examination of these and other legal doctrines is
warranted before considering what protections the law should afford.

96

LANE, supra note 8, at 10.
Brunner v. Al Attar, 786 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
98
Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
99
City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995) (holding that
refusing to hire applicants based on their smoking habit does not violate a
constitutional right to privacy because “individuals must reveal whether they smoke
in almost every aspect of life in today’s society” and thus cannot assert a legitimate
expectation of privacy); Mark A. Rothstein, Refusing to Employ Smokers: Good Public
Health or Bad Public Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 940, 951 (1987).
100
Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893 (Ct. App. 2004).
101
Daniel J. McCoy, Recent Privacy Law Developments Affecting the Workplace, 788
PLI/PAT. 435, 478 (2004).
97
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B. Existing Legal Resources and Limits on their Protections
Although largely vulnerable to the whims of his employer, the atwill employee is not totally without recourse when terminated. In
addition to the anti-discrimination laws previously discussed, tort law
also offers some remedies for more egregious abuses of the
102
employer’s power to fire.
These additional limits on the
employment-at-will doctrine, however, do not clearly prevent
employers from manipulating the after-hours pursuits of their
employees.
Recognizing this shortcoming, several states have
provided statutory protection for certain off-duty activities. However,
these statutes, along with the one federal law that could arguably
provide employees with a scintilla of privacy, would, like their
common law counterparts, fall short of protecting employees from a
gratuitous program of after-hours, location-based monitoring. The
following discussion further demonstrates that employees tracked
during after-hours activities currently lack legal protection.
1.

Common Law Doctrines

Employees may “cede control over many of their waking hours as
103
the price of being employed by another,” but the common law has
developed some limits on what an employer can extract from an
employee in exchange for a wage. An employer cannot order its
employees to take action that undermines “the interests of the
104
general community.”
Nor can an employer claim immunity from
privacy tort claims. Still, because “we tend to look to the market to
105
courts have been very
chasten abuses of employer power,”

102

Although the premise behind the employment-at-will doctrine is that both
employer and employee have equal opportunity to end the relationship, this
overlooks that in most cases, where an employer has many employees and an
employee has but one employer, the damage an employee can do to the employer’s
finances by quitting pales in comparison to the damage an employer can do to an
employee’s financial situation by firing her. Therefore, while “at will” is often seen as
equally dividing power over the employer-employee relationship, this view is
somewhat blind to the reality of the dynamics in this relationship. The employer
retains a great deal of “power.”
103
2 L. CAMILLE HERBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 13:3 (2004).
104
Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 679 (1996).
105
Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 221, 256 (1996) (explaining that this situation has come about “[n]ot
[because] we value privacy less, but [because] we seem to value legal nonintervention more”).
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conservative in their willingness to find for employees in suits alleging
106
violations of these common law protections.
a.

Employment-at-Will and Tortious Wrongful Discharge

As noted, employment-at-will is the default assumption in private
employment unless the parties specify otherwise.
Yet certain
doctrines have weakened the once absolute power of the employer to
107
fire “for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.”
States have
108
adopted, in various combinations, up to four theories of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy. These subsets of the wrongful
109
discharge doctrine protect employees who exercise statutory rights,
110
fulfill public obligations, “report the company’s unlawful conduct
111
to a supervisor or outside authorities” (whistleblowers), or refuse to
112
commit unlawful acts.
Generally, these intrusions into the private
employer-employee relationship have been justified because of the
third-party harms that might result when employees fail to follow the
113
law or to fulfill public duties as a result of pressure from employers.
An employer can thus, under common law, fire someone for any
reason—except one that constitutes wrongful discharge in the given
state.
However, the doctrine “has never been extended to terminations
114
in retaliation for conduct outside the employment relationship.”
106

See, e.g., Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 745 A.2d 178, 179 (Conn. 2000)
(denying the wrongful discharge claim of a secretary who “filed an anonymous
complaint with the Connecticut State Dental Association . . . alleging that the
defendants engaged in unsanitary and unhealthy practices in violation of the federal
Occupational Safety and Health Act”). To justify this decision, the court stated:
“[W]e note our adherence to the principle that the public policy exception to the
general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-will employment relationship is
a narrow one. We are mindful that courts should not lightly intervene to impair the
exercise of managerial discretion or to foment unwarranted litigation.” Id. at 182
(citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted).
107
Cynthia G. Dooley, Note, Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, the
Public Concern Requirement, and Employees’ Private Lives, 11 REV. LITIG. 387, 388 (1991)
(paraphrasing Payne v. W. Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884)).
108
See, e.g., Brunner v. Al Attar, 786 S.W.2d 784, 785–86 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)
(observing that Texas only recognizes “two exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine” and refusing to add to the list).
109
Id. (“The classic example is filing a claim for benefits under the workers’
compensation statute.”).
110
Id. (“The classic example is serving on jury duty.”).
111
Id.
112
WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 92, at 150.
113
Id.
114
Bammert v. Don’s Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Wis. 2002)
(declining to recognize a cause of action under the public policy exception to the
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Thus, the success of an employee’s wrongful discharge claim
challenging a dismissal for off-duty activities discovered through GPS
tracking techniques would depend entirely on the willingness of the
court to fit the employee’s activities into one of the recognized
115
Given how narrowly courts interpret these exceptions,
exceptions.
116
Are employees exercising a
this possibility seems unlikely.
“statutory right” if they go to a bar after work simply because alcohol
consumption is legal? Does working on a political campaign after
clocking out fulfill a public obligation, or does it merely constitute a
good deed? In both instances, an employee would likely fail in a suit
against his employer because courts generally look for a very specific
117
statutory right related to employment and, unlike jury duty, many
118
volunteer activities that provide public benefits are not obligations.

employment-at-will doctrine when an employer fired an employee whose husband
had participated in the arrest of the employer’s wife for driving while under the
influence).
115
Relying on the court to extend the public policy exception is particularly risky
because courts have not applied a consistent methodology when evaluating such
requests. See WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 92, at 151–52 (discussing how some courts
define “public policy” more broadly than others and consequently recognize more
instances of wrongful discharge); see also Henry H. Drummonds, The Dance of Statutes
and the Common Law: Employment, Alcohol, and Other Torts, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 939,
993 (2000) (accusing common law courts of making ad hoc determinations
regarding the legal basis for common law discharge accountability).
116
See, e.g., Bigelow v. Bullard, 901 P.2d 630, 633–34 (Nev. 1995) (rejecting a
claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy brought against an employer
who allegedly fired the plaintiff for arguing that “[b]lacks have rights, too” because
“the remark . . . was not made in opposition or objection to the company’s supposed
discriminatory policies”).
Seemingly, even a practice that contravenes antidiscrimination laws may not satisfy courts’ high standards for wrongful termination.
As long as Bullard was not fired for refusing to participate in or interfering with his
employer’s racially discriminatory practices, his discharge did not violate public
policy. Id.
117
See, e.g., Frankel v. Warwick Hotel, 881 F. Supp. 183, 186–87 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(holding that the state’s divorce code was merely a “vague and general expression of
the legislature’s view concerning the importance of family unity” and was insufficient
to support a wrongful discharge claim where the employer fired an employee who
refused his employer’s request that he divorce his wife); Johnson v. Carpenter Tech.
Corp., 723 F. Supp. 180, 184–85 (D. Conn. 1989) (rejecting employee’s wrongful
discharge claim based on violation of a drug testing procedure statute for employers
that was passed after the employee was fired for not taking a test); Karren v. Far W.
Fed. Savings, 717 P.2d 1271, 1273–74 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (firing an employee for
getting engaged may have interfered with a “right to marry,” but this right was a
private right, unrelated to her role as an employee); see also Roberts v. Alan Ritchey,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1028, 1031 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (expressing doubt that the
presumption of innocence provided by statute in Ohio created a public policy that
was violated when an employer discharged an employee for driving under the
influence, a charge that was later dropped). Narrowly decided cases like the
examples provided here made it necessary for states to enact statutes to prevent
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Privacy Torts

Given the tortious wrongful discharge doctrine’s limitations,
employees scrutinized beyond reason might turn to simple tort claims
for relief. The common law includes a tort for the invasion of
privacy, which proscribes four types of activity: intrusion upon
seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness, public disclosure of
119
private facts, and false light. Two of these branches, intrusion upon
seclusion and public disclosure of private facts, are potentially
relevant in a case involving after-hours, location-based monitoring.
The former tort can be asserted against the employer while the latter
might be brought against either the employer or the GPS service
provider. The following subsections describe how each version of the
invasion of privacy tort might apply in employee tracking cases.
(1) Unreasonable Intrusion on the Right of Seclusion
The prima facie elements of an intrusion upon seclusion claim
include: “(1) an intentional invasion or intrusion; (2) that is highly
offensive to a reasonable person; (3) occurring where there is a
120
Particularly relevant to an
reasonable expectation of privacy.”
examination of a GPS monitoring case, the tortious invasion need not
be physical, as “use of the defendant’s senses, with or without
mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private
121
affairs” also qualifies as an actionable invasion. Moreover, “[t]he

employees from being fired for legal off-duty activities. See discussion infra Part
III.B.2.
118
See Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1032–33 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that dismissal for pro bono work advocating equal rights for
homosexuals does not violate public policy).
119
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). This provision summarizes
the ways in which the right of privacy can be invaded:
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in
§ 652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in § 652C;
or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in
§ 652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before
the public, as stated in § 652E.
Id.
120
Corbett, supra note 10, at 109–10 (paraphrasing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (1977) (“One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.”)).
121
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977).
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intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability, even though
122
there is no [use] of the . . . information.”
The reasonable expectation of privacy requirement, however,
impedes employees’ abilities to bring intrusion upon seclusion cases
123
against employers. Logically, this result makes sense, for “so long as
the individual is in a public place, it is unlikely that she can maintain
124
an argument that there was a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’”
Several courts have consequently denied privacy claims brought
against employers who videotaped their employees engaged in off125
duty activities that “could be seen . . . by anyone driving by.”
Additionally, the intrusion upon seclusion tort claim can easily be
undermined by employers who simply notify employees that devices
with GPS tracking capabilities may watch them around the clock—
thus eviscerating any reasonable expectation of privacy that an
employee might otherwise have had.
Still, although “[t]he law has long recognized that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in a public place . . . one does not
126
reasonably expect that she will be stalked and followed.”
Some
authors have argued that case law supports a reasonable expectation
of some privacy even in public places. The “mere observation of a
person’s public activities [might not be] an intrusion upon
127
However, an “[overzealous] sensory observation of a
seclusion.”

122

Id.
As one commentator observed, “Most invasion of privacy claims in the
employment context fail because courts find either that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy or that the invasion would not be highly offensive to a
reasonable person or both.” Corbett, supra note 10, at 110.
124
Karim, supra note 36, at 508–09.
125
York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 759 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
employee’s privacy was not invaded when the employer, as part of an investigation of
a workers’ compensation claim, videotaped the employee “in his yard, driving on
public streets, and walking in public places” because “these activities were . . . open to
the public”); I.C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 685, 689–90 (Ala. 2000)
(“Because the activities Jones carried on in his front yard[, including his urinating,]
could have been observed by any passerby, we conclude that any intrusion by ICU
into Jones’s privacy was not ‘wrongful’ and, therefore, was not actionable.”); McLain
v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 345 (Or. 1975) (upholding a grant of nonsuit
for an invasion of privacy claim because the “activities which were filmed could have
been observed by . . . neighbors or passersby on the road”).
126
White, supra note 40, at 1.
127
Sheri L. Caldwell et al., 2002 John Marshall National Moot Court Competition in
Information Technology and Privacy Law: Brief for the Petitioner, 21 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 59, 74 (2002) (citing Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d
765, 771 (N.Y. 1970)); see also HARTSFIELD, supra note 89, § 7:13 (“Mere gathering of
information about an individual usually does not give rise to a claim for invasion of
123
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person’s activities in public . . . [might] be an actionable intrusion.”
The possibility of success on an intrusion of seclusion claim for afterhours geographic tracking of employees therefore may not be
completely foreclosed, but it is questionable at best. Moreover, an
expectation that one cannot be stalked, like the more general
reasonable expectation of privacy, may be just as susceptible to
obliteration through notice from the employer.
(2) Publicity Given to a Private Life
Alternatively, in a case against an employer and/or the company
that provides the tracking technology, the tort for publicity given to a
private life might apply. The tort states in full that
[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the matter publicized is the kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of
129
legitimate concern to the public.

But success on such a claim in an employee tracking case will be
difficult, given the accepted definitions of “publicized” and “private
life” used in an analysis of this tort.
The comments accompanying the definition of publicity given to
a private life in the Second Restatement of Torts clearly state that “it is
not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule stated in this
Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff’s private life
130
to a single person or even to a small group of persons.”
Thus, a
GPS service provider’s act of supplying an employer with the
information obtained from its tracking system would not constitute
publicizing—even if the information was published on a website—as
privacy. . . . However, aggressive surveillance of even public acts can serve as grounds
for an invasion of privacy claim.” (citations omitted)).
128
Id.; see also Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 383–84 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989) (examining an employee’s invasion of privacy claim against his employer,
where an investigator “posed as a process server for the purpose of looking around
the plaintiff’s home” and used a powerful camera lens to look through the plaintiff’s
windows. The court reasoned that “[i]t may not be objectionable to peer through an
open window where the curtains are not drawn, but the use of a powerful lens to
observe the interior of a home or of a subterfuge to enter a home could be found
objectionable to a reasonable person.”). But see Baggs v. Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc.,
957 F.2d 268, 275 (6th Cir. 1992) (recognizing the right of “a Michigan employer
[to] use intrusive and even objectionable means to obtain employment-related
information about an employee” in a case involving an employee’s refusal to take an
employer-administered drug test after undercover police surveillance reported that
sixty percent of employees used illegal drugs).
129
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
130
Id. cmt. a.
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long as only a select group of supervisors has access to the site. The
wide dissemination of information, not its mere recording or
132
discovery, triggers the protection against publicity. This reality also
cripples use of the publicity tort against an employer, for as long as
the employer uses the tracking information only to discharge or to
discipline an employee, and does not post the facts discovered in the
break room for all to see, the publicity requirement will not be
133
satisfied.
Even if the publicity requirement were not an obstacle,
employees suing service providers and employers would also struggle
to show that the information revealed concerned the employee’s
private life. The Restatement asserts that “there is no liability for giving
further publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the
134
public eye.” Therefore, “[a]n individual . . . would most likely have
no cause of action under the publicity tort, so long as the information

131

Many of the GPS service providers allow their customers to access fleet and
employee management data via the Internet. See, e.g., Comet Tracker Technology,
http://www.comettracker.com/technology.html.
132
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977) (“‘Publicity,’ as it is
used in this Section, differs from ‘publication’ . . . . ‘Publication,’ in [other contexts],
is a word of art, which includes any communication by the defendant to a third
person. ‘Publicity,’ on the other hand, means that the matter is made public, by
communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must
be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.”); see also
Renenger, supra note 82, at 557 (“Recovery is also not available if the fact the person
desires to keep private is not widely circulated by a defendant, but only released to a
select group of people. Thus, if an employer decides not to hire a job applicant
because, through exploitation of cell-phone data, the employer discovers that the
applicant makes weekly visits to an AIDS clinic, there would be no cause of action
against the party who released the location data for publication of private
information.”).
133
Even dissemination to a limited group of non-supervisory co-workers does not
appear to constitute “publicity.” See Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 16 P.3d 555,
559 (Utah 2000) (awarding summary judgment to the employer even though the
employer allowed a group of ten employees to view footage capturing the plaintiff’s
sexual assault); see also Wells v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426, 437–38 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(revealing the terms of an employee’s discharge to two persons who did not have an
employment related need for this information does not constitute “publicity” as
defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652D); Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74,
77–78 (Okla. 1986) (holding that a discussion of plaintiff’s medical condition among
“only a small group of co-workers” did not constitute publicity of private affairs). But
see Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (recognizing a
cause of action for public disclosure of private facts when the publicity was not
widespread because “where a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the
‘public’ to whom the information has been disclosed, [as is the case among fellow
employees,] the disclosure may be just as devastating to the person even though the
disclosure was made to a limited number of people”).
134
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
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135

is collected in public areas.”
The publicity tort suffers from the
same limitation common to most of the invasion of privacy torts—one
generally cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard
to activities in public places. If an employee walks into a bar after
work, in plain view of the community, she cannot bring an invasion of
privacy claim against her teetotaler employer who tracks her
movements and fires her for taking a drink.
More generally, both the common law claims discussed in this
section, wrongful discharge and the invasion of privacy tort, are not
fully equipped to address an employee’s dismissal for after-hours
activities discovered through off-duty electronic surveillance. The
discussion here recognizes how these doctrines might be read to
support some protection for an employee, but also reveals that the
law would still need to evolve before tracked employees could truly
rely on its protections. Waiting for common law evolution is not,
however, an adequate solution to the problem presented by locationbased employee tracking. “Such judicial activism would . . . be
piecemeal by nature and would not provide uniform protection of
workplace privacy rights. Employees who suffer similar intrusions will
136
Such a
often receive differing protection of their privacy rights.”
solution would also be untenable from the employer’s perspective,
given that many employers operate in multiple states and some
manage a workforce that crosses state lines. National employers
would have difficultly developing programs that comply with the
protections provided by various common law doctrines, assuming that
state courts are ready and willing to extend their jurisprudence.
2.

State Laws Protecting Legal Activity Outside of Work

Like the common law doctrines discussed in the last section,
existing state laws also fail to provide protection for employees
monitored after hours. State laws protecting after-work activities have
effectively balanced employers’ and employees’ interests in some
specific contexts, but the protected categories are narrow and/or full
of exceptions. Additionally, state laws suffer from the same lack of
uniformity as the common law. Therefore, this Article ultimately
advocates for a federal solution to the employee tracking problem.
However, an examination of these state laws provides some guidance
on how employees’ off-duty interests can be protected from employer
scrutiny through targeted and balanced legislation.

135
136

Karim, supra note 36, at 508.
Wilborn, supra note 24, at 855.
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At last count, nearly three-fifths of the states had some law
restricting the ability of employers to take action against employees
137
based on their pursuits after work. “The statutes range from merely
protecting the rights of smokers to protecting all off-duty conduct
138
. . . .”
Many of these statutes were, however, enacted for the very
limited purpose of providing employees with a right to use certain
139
products not proscribed by law.
The few statutes that do protect a
more general category of off-duty conduct tend to provide employers
with an exception for conduct that conflicts with the employer’s
140
As a result, even in states with more generous
business interests.
137

See Pagnattaro, supra note 58, at 629 n.9.
Id. at 629.
139
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304(e)(2) (2003). Professor Pagnattaro provides a
comprehensive list of the statutes prohibiting discharge for smoking and use of other
products after hours:
The following state[] statutes prohibit an employer from infringing on
an employee’s right to use tobacco products outside of work: ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 36-601.02(f) (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1703.03 (2001); IND.
CODE ANN. § 22-5-4-1 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040(3)
(Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:966 (West 2003); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-7-33 (2003);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37-a (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-1 (West
2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-11-3 (Michie 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40,
§ 500 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.315 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2320.7.1-1.(a) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-85 (Law Co-op. 2003); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-11 (Michie 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1504
(Michie 2003); W. VA. CODE § 21-3-19 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9105(a)(iv) (Michie 2002). The following states make it unlawful for an
employer to punish an employee for using lawful products off-duty: 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 55/5 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. § 181.938
(2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 613.333 (Michie 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (2003); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 111.31, 111.35 (West 2003).
Pagnattaro, supra note 58, at 629 n.9. However, even these seemingly straightforward
laws do not guarantee an unfettered right to use the products specified. For
example, the South Dakota legislature qualified its right to smoke after hours with a
bona fide occupational qualification exception. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-11(1)
(Michie 2003). In Wood v. South Dakota Cement Plant, the state supreme court held
that an assistant kiln operator, who would work in a dusty environment and in
extreme temperatures, could be prohibited from smoking while off-duty, despite the
statute’s protections. 588 N.W.2d 227, 230–31 (S.D. 1999).
140
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a) (2003) (declaring unlawful an
employer’s termination of an employee for the employee’s participation “in any
lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours [that is
unrelated] to a bona fide occupational requirement”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q
(West Supp. 2005) (protecting an employee’s off-duty exercise of constitutional
rights as long as the employee’s activities “[do] not substantially or materially
interfere with the employee’s bona fide job performance or the working relationship
between the employee and the employer”); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 201-d(2)(c), (3)(a)
(McKinney 2003) (prohibiting dismissal for “an individual’s legal recreational
138
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off-duty activity protections, an employer could still take action
141
against a frequent consumer of Big Macs if the position at issue
required a certain standard of physical health. Under these laws, an
employer would need only to find a way to couch its objections to an
employee’s activities in business interest terms to justify using the
information from a GPS monitoring system to fire an employee. In
sum, these laws have effectively accomplished their goals by providing
some off-duty privacy, but most are too specific to cover many of the
142
Even the state laws
activities that GPS monitoring might discover.
that offer broader protection are limited in ways that might
undermine an employee’s attempts to keep his personal activities
143
separate from his qualifications as an employee.

activities outside work hours, off of the employer’s premises and without use of the
employer’s equipment or other property” unless it “creates a material conflict of
interest related to the employer’s trade secrets, proprietary information or other
proprietary or business interest”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (1997) (protecting
“participation in lawful activity off the employer’s premises during nonworking hours
which is not in direct conflict with the essential business-related interests of the
employer”).
141
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
142
See supra note 139 (listing the many laws protecting only one activity—
smoking—that takes place away from the office).
143
California appeared to have created a broad, absolute protection for after-work
activities when it amended its labor code to allow the Labor Commissioner to pursue
claims for lost wages resulting from discharge based on off-duty activities. CAL. LAB.
CODE § 96(k) (West 2004) (providing the Labor Commissioner with the power to
“take assignment of . . . claims for loss of wages as the result of demotion, suspension,
or discharge for the lawful conduct occurring during non-working hours away from
the employer’s premises”). “Rather surprisingly, [section 96(k)] of the California
Labor Code [did] not contain any exceptions, like those contained in similar statutes
in New York, North Dakota and Colorado . . . .” Pagnattaro, supra note 58, at 647–48.
But subsequent interpretation by the Attorney General severely limited the scope of
the law and its usefulness. In response to a state senator’s inquiry as to whether
“peace officers could be disciplined for engaging in lawful activities during nonworking hours if such activities were inconsistent with their duties as peace officers,”
the Attorney General responded that, if warranted, law enforcement may discipline
officers for such activities. 83 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 226 (2000), 2000 WL 1514816
(“Courts have long recognized that, while the off-duty conduct of employees is
generally of no legal consequence to their employers, the public expects peace
officers to be ‘above suspicion of violation of the very laws [they are] sworn . . . to
enforce.’”) (quoting Pasadena Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Pasadena, 797 P.2d 608,
611 (Cal. 1990)) (alterations in original). Although tailored to the unique role of
peace officers, the opinion included a sweeping statement that “the 1999
amendment of section 96 did not create new substantive rights for employees.
Rather, it established a procedural mechanism that allows the Commissioner to
assert, on behalf of employees, their independently recognized constitutional rights”
or other rights “exist[ing] elsewhere in the law.” Id.
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Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1996

Existing federal laws covering various forms of electronic
monitoring likewise cannot offer the tracked employee any relief.
144
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1996 (“ECPA”) is
not applicable to a discussion of GPS tracking systems, although it is
often discussed in analyses of other forms of employee surveillance
technologies, including programs that monitor Internet use and
145
employee e-mail. “[U]nlike pen registers and other electronic trap
and trace devices, the Privacy Act requirements of consent or
authorization do not apply to electronic signals from a tracking
146
Although
device, because no communication is involved.”
information about someone’s whereabouts does arguably
communicate information about that person, the statute specifically
147
does not cover “any communication from a tracking device,” which
is defined as “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the
148
Therefore, a
tracking of the movement of a person or object.”
detailed discussion of this act is not warranted. The act has limited, if
any, usefulness as a tool for protecting the privacy of employees
under GPS surveillance.
As this section demonstrates, existing statutes and common laws
remain too narrow to encompass the situation where an employer
monitors employees after hours simply to exercise more control over
the personalities it employs. Thus, the law fails, at this time, to
provide any shelter from the pervasive stare of GPS satellites in the
employment context. However, as the next section explains, people
are not similarly exposed in other contexts. An inconsistent legal
framework that shields the personal errands of law-abiding citizens
from the prying gaze of almost everyone except employers is hard to
defend.
IV. HOW GPS TECHNOLOGY IS REGULATED IN OTHER CONTEXTS
Use of GPS technology to monitor people’s movements has
ruffled feathers outside of the employment arena as well. The
technology has been used by law enforcement to track criminal
144

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521, 2701–2712 (2000).
See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 4, at 295–96 (noting that the ECPA “is normally
interpreted to encompass e-mail”).
146
State v. Jackson, 46 P.3d 257, 270 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (dismissing claims
challenging use of GPS to track a criminal suspect based on state privacy law).
147
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(c) (“‘electronic communication’ . . . does not include . . .
any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this title)”).
148
Id. § 3117(b).
145
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suspects and parolees. Businesses that rent equipment to customers
have also used GPS devices to survey the location of their property
and how it is used. The legal and political worlds’ responses to these
various uses of GPS technology therefore offer additional ideas for
how to structure a policy governing the remote supervision of
employees. Right now, the law’s treatment of employees most closely
resembles the paradigm for acceptable uses of GPS tracking
technologies in law enforcement. This section argues that the
treatment of criminal suspects is a poor model for how employees
should be treated.
A. Use of GPS in Law Enforcement
Currently, the law regarding the use of GPS by police officers is
in flux. Law enforcement has, for some time, used a variety of
sensory-enhancing aids to apprehend criminals. Consequently, many
courts, analogizing GPS to other acceptable uses of technology, have
no problem with officers using these devices to enforce the law more
149
efficiently.
A few courts, however, have more carefully considered
how GPS devices might be more intrusive than other approved
tracking technologies—to the point of warranting a different
150
Still, in most contexts, GPS tracking technology can be
doctrine.
151
used to apprehend suspects and monitor convicted criminals.
1.

Monitoring Suspects

As noted, officers in the past have used other technologies to
track suspects. One precursor of GPS appears to have been “the
beeper,” a radio transmitter that emitted periodic signals capable of
152
Although the beeper did not
being “heard” by a radio receiver.
resemble a GPS tracking system in form or function, it served a
similar purpose: the beeper could be used to track vehicles, their
operators, and virtually any object that harbored the device. Because
of its widespread use, even the Supreme Court has addressed
electronic tracking as part of law enforcement surveillance.
153
In United States v. Knotts, law enforcement officers planted a
beeper in a can of chemicals purchased by a suspected manufacturer

149

See infra notes 152–60, 172–77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
151
Schumann, supra note 19, at 60 (“[T]o date there is no Fourth Amendment
bar to GPS track evidence.”).
152
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
153
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
150
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154

of illegal drugs.
The officers had the suspect under visual
surveillance, but when they lost sight of the suspect’s vehicle, they
155
relied on the beeper to determine the location of the chemicals. In
rejecting the defendant’s claim that this electronic surveillance
violated his Fourth Amendment rights against illegal searches and
156
seizures, the Court held that “beepers are merely a more effective
157
means of observing what is already public.”
As long as officers do
not use electronic surveillance to go where they could not legally
158
follow, the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights remain intact.
159
In United States v. Karo,
another case involving a beeper
implanted in a can of ingredients for drugs, the Court further refined
160
the Knotts rule.
The Court distinguished Karo on its facts because
in Karo, the defendants actually brought the bugged can of chemicals
into a private residence, a place that officers could not legally observe
without a search warrant. Consequently, the Court held that the
information obtained from the continued monitoring of the
container after it left the public view could not be used against the
defendant. However, the Court reversed the appellate court’s
suppression of evidence obtained using a search warrant that was
based on the electronic surveillance data because the warrant
affidavit would have still been sufficient even if the facts gleaned from
161
More relevant to the
unconstitutional surveillance were excluded.
discussion at hand, though, is the general rule that Knotts and Karo
stand for: the government can track people right up to their front
doors without violating a legally recognized privacy interest.
Recent decisions reveal that the applicability of the Karo/Knotts
reasoning in a GPS tracking case remains unclear. In State v.
162
Jackson,
the police installed GPS tracking devices on cars
impounded as part of an investigation into the disappearance and

154

Id. at 278–79.
Id.
156
Although Fourth Amendment rights do not apply to private employeremployee arrangements, a discussion of criminal cases is relevant to the arguments
made in this Article because, as the discussion will demonstrate, in an unregulated
state, an employee harassed through after-hours surveillance has rights comparable
to those of criminal suspects and parolees, rather than the significantly greater
protections afforded to consumers and other law-abiding groups.
157
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284.
158
Id. at 284–85 (dicta).
159
468 U.S. 705 (1984).
160
Id. at 708.
161
Id. at 721 n.7.
162
46 P.3d 257 (Wash. App. 2002).
155
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suspected murder of William Jackson’s nine year-old daughter.
The appellate court rejected Jackson’s challenge to the adequacy of
the procedures used to obtain a warrant for installation of the
tracking devices because, under Karo, Knotts, and their progeny, “no
search warrant was required under the state or federal constitution to
164
Echoing the reasoning in Knotts, the
use the GPS devices . . . .”
court declared that “[t]he Fourth Amendment . . . does not prohibit
use of scientific enhancements to augment sensory faculties used to
165
observe what is already open to the public.”
But the Washington Supreme Court accepted Jackson’s petition
166
and ultimately disagreed with the appellate court’s
for review
167
analysis. The court reasoned that “the GPS device does not merely
augment the officers’ senses, but rather provides a technological
168
substitute for traditional visual tracking.” Because a GPS device can
“disclose a great deal about an individual’s life” by “reveal[ing]
preferences, alignments, associations, personal ails, and foibles” the
court held that such tracking constitutes an invasion that, when
conducted without a warrant, violates the protections of the state
169
constitution’s search and seizure clause.
The court still upheld
Jackson’s conviction and sentence, however, because the officers had
170
obtained valid warrants before installing the tracking devices.
Although presently limited to an interpretation of the
Washington State Constitution, Jackson may become the rule of law
for evaluating GPS surveillance procedures under the Federal
171
The Washington Supreme Court suggested that GPS
Constitution.
devices differ in relevant ways from an electronic beeper, which
163

Id. at 260–61.
Id. at 270–72.
165
Id. at 270.
166
State v. Jackson, 62 P.3d 889 (Wash. 2003).
167
State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003).
168
Id. at 223.
169
Id. at 223–24. Jackson did not base his appeal on the lower court’s Fourth
Amendment holding and consequently, the Washington Supreme Court did not
address the constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking under the Federal
Constitution.
170
Id. at 220.
171
The Washington Privacy Clause, which states “[n]o person shall be disturbed
in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law,” WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 7, is “much more restrictive than the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth
Amendment,” Schumann, supra note 19, at 9. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
164
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officers must actively follow in a manner similar to chasing a vehicle
through the streets. In contrast, GPS goes one step further, enabling
officers to “watch” a suspect for weeks at a time. Without leaving the
station or putting forth much effort, officers can obtain a detailed
172
Still, other courts
trail of a suspect’s past and present location.
have comfortably extended the beeper doctrine to GPS devices. In
173
United States v. McIver, the Ninth Circuit held that a warrantless use
of both GPS and beeper tracking devices was not unconstitutional
because tracking a vehicle “thrust into the public eye . . . does not
174
constitute a ‘search.’”
2.

Monitoring Parolees
175

Likewise, a California appellate court in People v. Zichwic
upheld law enforcement’s use of GPS devices, albeit in the context of
176
monitoring parolees and not suspects.
Zichwic concluded that
attaching a GPS tracking device to a parolee’s car did not require a
warrant, for even if such activity could be considered a search,
Zichwic’s status as a parolee, and the reduced expectation of privacy
177
that necessarily accompanies such status, justified using the device.
The court also observed, in dicta, that regardless of Zichwic’s status as
a parolee, installing a GPS tracking device on a vehicle did not
constitute a search because people cannot have an “objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in what is regularly exposed to
178
public view.”
But even a parolee’s reduced expectation of privacy does not
necessarily allow for unrestrained use of GPS tracking technology. In
179
State v. Chism, the trial court modified Chism’s home detention
180
conditions to include non-stop GPS surveillance. Subsequently, the
appellate court invalidated this order because it went beyond the
172

Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223.
186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999).
174
Id. at 1126 (quoting New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986)); see also
United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a
suspect “ha[s] no expectation of privacy in the whereabouts of his vehicle on a public
roadway” and thus the use of a GPS device to track vehicles does not implicate the
Fourth Amendment).
175
114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733 (2001).
176
Id. at 736.
177
Id. at 740 (noting that the Supreme Court has held that a probation search can
be “justified by a reasonable suspicion that the probationer was engaged in criminal
activity”).
178
Id. at 740, 742.
179
813 N.E.2d 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
180
Id. at 408.
173

YUNG FINAL.DOC

200

10/12/2005 11:28:21 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:163

court’s statutorily created authority to require a record of when an
offender in a home detention program was and was not actually
181
The court added that when a home detainee
present in his home.
qualifies as a violent offender, subjected to “constant supervision . . .
using . . . surveillance equipment,” GPS tracking may be
permissible—but this condition did not apply to Chism, a regular
182
(not violent) offender.
The case then advanced to the Indiana
Supreme Court, which rejected the appellate court’s decision and
held instead that broadcast devices are acceptable tools for
183
As a result, this tortured case, in its
monitoring all parolees.
entirety, embodies the legal system’s struggle to find appropriate uses
for GPS technology and reasonable limits on its invasive capabilities—
even when the subjects of monitoring are convicted criminals.
184
While by no means settled, the law regarding the use of GPS
devices in the criminal context offers some interesting comparisons
with the law regarding use of this technology to observe employees.
In all instances, the acceptable use of GPS hinges on a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and both Fourth Amendment law and tort law
have found such an expectation unreasonable when activity takes
185
place in the “public eye.” But the Jackson decision suggests that this
assumption should be reconsidered in light of the extremely invasive
nature of GPS monitoring systems. Additionally, Indiana courts have
made arguments for and against the rights of convicted felons to
statutorily created protections against overly invasive uses of GPS
tracking technology. At a minimum, law abiding employees certainly
186
If
deserve the same protections as criminal suspects and convicts.
181
182
183

Id. at 409–10.
Id. at 410–11.
Chism v. State, 824 N.E.2d 334, 335 (Ind. 2005), vacating Chism, 813 N.E.2d

402.
184

See United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Md. 2004) (pondering
whether the U.S. Supreme Court will extend Knotts and Karo’s beeper analysis to GPS
devices but declining to “decide whether modern GPS devices effect a search and
seizure”).
185
See supra notes 134, 174 (addressing the “public eye” argument against tort and
Fourth Amendment claims, respectively).
186
At least in the case of parolees, one can argue that GPS tracking makes sense.
These devices enable more efficient and cost-effective supervision of people who
were convicted of crimes and, for the term of their punishment, forfeited some of
the expectations of privacy they would have enjoyed otherwise. GPS might also more
effectively deter recidivism, as data recorded with a GPS device can be “crosstabulated . . . with crime incident data being reported by participating law
enforcement agencies” and “crime-mapping software can be used to pinpoint
whether monitored offenders were in the vicinity of a reported crime close to the
time it was committed.” Cecil E. Greek, Tracking Probationers in Space and Time: The
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society’s significant interest in deterring recidivism cannot justify
boundless location-based surveillance, it seems incongruous to grant
employers a monitoring power greater than that of law enforcement.
The interest asserted by the employer could not possibly be more
187
substantial.
B. Use of GPS by Businesses to Monitor Consumers
At least in one area, lawmakers have quickly responded to the
abusive intrusions made possible by GPS tracking devices. Rental car
companies created quite a stir when customers discovered that their
service providers had monitored their driving patterns for the express
purpose of assessing fines for misuse. Caught off guard and unaware,
customers racked up hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of dollars
in penalty charges. For example:
In one case, a family picked up a car at a Payless Car Rental in San
Francisco and began a 12-day road trip through several Western
States. When [they] returned the vehicle, they received a $3,405
bill for violating the rental contract which prohibited them from
leaving California: $1/mile for every mile driven out-of-state.
Convergence of GIS and GPS Systems, FED. PROBATION, June 2002, at 51. The criminal
justice system could better control the threat posed by convicts released early from
overcrowded prisons by using GPS tracking technology to more effectively
apprehend members of an at-risk, and perhaps not yet fully rehabilitated,
population. Unlike employers, law enforcement officers have a substantial interest in
using GPS tracking devices around the clock because public safety might be
enhanced.
187
It is true that criminal suspects and parolees might have Fourth Amendment
protections that do not apply in the world of private employment. See supra notes 69,
156. The law has traditionally been suspicious of government power, as evidenced by
the limits the founders placed on state sponsored invasions of personal space. See
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In contrast, the law has favored a market-based approach for
curbing employer abuses of power. Finkin, supra note 105, at 10; supra text
accompanying note 105; see also Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 745 A.2d 178, 182
(Conn. 2000) (expressing discomfort with interfering in the employer-employee
relationship). Contra Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, On Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1994) (lamenting the departure from a market-based approach
to employment regulation embodied in anti-discrimination and other employment
laws). However, both the constitutional and tort doctrines protecting privacy are
subject to a reasonableness requirement, and allowing private employers, who can be
held accountable for tortious invasions, to treat employees worse than paroled
convicts certainly seems unreasonable. Moreover, in the context of location based
services, the threat posed by a Big Brother government, as opposed to a Big Brother
employer, may have been more ominous when only the government had access to
GPS. But now that the system has been opened to civilian use, employers’ actions
can be just as invasive as the government’s. See supra notes 29, 30, 36, 38 and
accompanying text; see also Lever, supra note 14, at 219 (discussing the end of
government’s selective availability program, which once allowed only limited use of
the satellite system by civilian operations).
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When the family complained, arguing that they didn’t know they
were prohibited from driving out-of-state, the company presented
them with a map showing their exact route outside of California
as detailed by a tracking device in the car. In addition, the
company argued that the family should have known about the
[system used to track them] because their contract stated that the
car “might be equipped with a tracking device.” . . . [But this
information was] in fine print in an addendum to the contract
188
and was never mentioned by the rental agent to the family.

Similarly, American Car Rental surprised James Turner when it
withdrew $450 from his account to cover three instances of speeding
189
recorded by a GPS tracking device.
One commentator noted that
the company imposed these penalties “even though [Turner] had
received no tickets from Connecticut state troopers, and had not
190
been able to contest the allegations in court.”
Motivated by this great injustice, one state quickly enacted
consumer protection legislation in response. On August 25, 2004,
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger of California signed into law an
amendment to the Civil Code regulations of vehicle rental
agreements. The law “prohibits a rental company that uses electronic
surveillance technology in its rental vehicles from using, accessing, or
obtaining information relating to the renter’s use of the rental
191
In the California
vehicle that was obtained using that technology.”
188

CAL. STATE ASSEMBLY COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REG. SESS., BILL ANALYSIS OF A.B.
2840 (Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter A.B. 2840 BILL ANALYSIS].
189
Turner v. Am. Car Rental, No. CV010456353S, 2004 WL 1888947 (Conn.
Super. Ct. July 21, 2004); see also A.B. 2840 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 188. Like the
Payless family, Mr. Turner was “warned” about this practice in the fine print of his
contract. Turner, 2004 WL 1888947, at *2 (“The lease stated there was a global
positioning system (GPS) in the vehicle, and it also stated that if the plaintiff
exceeded the posted speed limit he would be charged $150.00 for each such
occurrence.”).
190
White, supra note 40, at 5. Mr. Turner eventually prevailed, however, when a
jury returned a verdict in favor of his invasion of privacy claim. Turner, 2004 WL
1888947, at *1. The court ordered a refund of the $450 fine as well as attorney’s
fees. Id. at *2; see also Am. Car Rental v. Comm’r of Consumer Prot., 869 A.2d 1198,
1201 (Conn. 2005) (holding that speeding fees unrelated to the actual damage done
to the car, which depends on the duration of excessive speed and not the number of
times a renter exceeded the speed limit, “constitute[s] an illegal penalty and . . . an
unfair trade practice offensive to public policy”).
191
Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, New Laws for California
Consumers (Dec. 31, 2004), available at http://www.dca.ca.gov/press_releases/2004/
1231.htm; see also Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill 2840 (Cal. 2004). In relevant
part, the law states: “A rental company may not use, access, or obtain any information
relating to the renter’s use of the rental vehicle that was obtained using electronic
surveillance technology, except in the following circumstances . . . .” CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1936(o) (West Supp. 2005).
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consumer bill, notice to the customer is not enough—the state
imposed a blanket ban on any use of GPS devices for surveillance of
rental car customers.
Like employers, rental car companies also have legitimate
business reasons for monitoring renters after they leave the lot.
Indeed, Payless only sought “to make sure business travelers and
192
Of
other customers adhere[d] to in-state travel agreements . . . .”
equal, if not more, importance to the rental agency is an ability to
recover lost or stolen vehicles. Additionally, because GPS systems can
also provide information about miles traveled, these devices offer a
convenient way to keep track of information used to maintain the
fleet. The California law, however, recognizes some of these
concerns and provides important exceptions that take these interests
into account. Electronic surveillance technology can be used to
193
But, “[a] rental
recover vehicles and provide timely maintenance.
company may not use electronic surveillance technology to track a
renter in order to impose fines or surcharges relating to the renter’s
194
use of the rental vehicle.” As Part V will describe, similar provisions
in a law protecting employees from discipline for information
discovered through invasive monitoring could recognize an
employer’s legitimate interest in fleet and personnel management,
while still providing employees with reasonable privacy protections.
A “balancing of interests solution,” similar to the one governing the
business-customer relationship, makes more sense in the context of
employment—as opposed to the “one-sided, absolute power” model

192

See, e.g., Darcy, supra note 65.
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1936(o)(1)(A)(i)–(iii), (o)(6) (West Supp. 2005).
194
Id. § 1936(p). California’s response to notorious instances of customer
surveillance has not yet been duplicated in the federal arena or elsewhere. In 2001,
Senator John Edwards proposed the “Location Privacy Protection Act of 2001.”
S. 1164, 107th Cong. (2001). A piece of consumer protection legislation, the bill
hoped “[t]o provide for the enhanced protection of the privacy of location
information of users of location-based services and applications . . . .” Id. If passed,
the bill would have required the FCC to promulgate rules governing location-based
service providers’ responsibility to provide detailed notice of their customer
information collection practices. Id. Additionally, service providers would have
needed customer authorization to collect, use, or retain customer data. Id. The bill
did not, however, progress beyond its assignment to the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation. This may have been a result of unfortunate timing—
“[i]n the wake of the tragedy of September 11, the attitude toward the propriety of
widespread surveillance . . . markedly changed.” Mark G. Young, What Big Eyes and
Ears You Have!: A New Regime for Covert Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1017, 1018 (2002). Recent rumblings in the state legislatures suggest that we are
again ready to have a discussion about sensible limits on surveillance. See discussion
supra Part III.B.2 and infra Part V.B.
193
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that appears to control the law enforcement-criminal suspect
relationship.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REASONABLE PROTECTION AGAINST GPS
MONITORING OF EMPLOYEES
As explained in Part II, GPS tracking devices offer businesses in
a range of industries an unprecedented ability to control remote
operations.
But this technology also creates unparalleled
opportunities to invade an employee’s personal life. As use of “the
type of technology used in the criminal justice system to track
195
prisoners” becomes commonplace, we will lose our ability to object
to these invasions, because accepted practices will redefine our
196
“reasonable expectations.” Indeed, in the employment context, we
have already seen privacy erode as the law has refused to protect
197
many employee communications and after-hours activities.
Although this Article does not challenge these well-established
doctrines regarding off-duty privacy in general, it does call for a
different rule when GPS technology is involved. As the Jackson
opinion suggested, GPS tracking systems simply put more
information than necessary in the hands of those who can use it
198
unjustly.
A. Federal Laws that have Failed
Admittedly, if past efforts are any indicator of future success,
then establishing a privacy right for employees, even one limited to
after-hours, off-site surveillance, will be difficult to achieve. Recent
legislative proposals for federal protection have not fared well.
195

Michael R. Triplett, Employee Tracking Technology Raises Privacy Concerns and
Potential Employee Backlash, 72 U.S.L.W. 2664, May 4, 2004 (quoting Cindy-Ann L.
Thomas, attorney).
196
See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
197
See supra notes 4–5, 92–101 and accompanying text; see also infra note 282.
198
See supra notes 166–72 and accompanying text; see also State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d
217 (Wash. 2003). Relevant to this discussion, the court in Jackson observed that:
[T]he intrusion into private affairs made possible with a GPS device is
quite extensive as the information obtained can disclose a great deal
about an individual’s life. For example, the device can provide a
detailed record of travel to doctors’ offices, banks, gambling casinos,
tanning salons, places of worship, political party meetings, bars, grocery
stores, exercise gyms, places where children are dropped off for school,
play, or day care, the upper scale restaurant and the fast food
restaurant, the strip club, the opera, the baseball game, the “wrong”
side of town, the family planning clinic, the labor rally.
Id. at 262.
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However, these failures provide guidance for drafting a more
successful policy.
1.

Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act (PCWA)

In 1993, the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act (“PCWA”)
199
debuted in both the Senate and the House. “[D]esigned to prevent
200
abuses of electronic monitoring in the workplace,” these nearly
identical bills sought to prohibit “the collection, storage, analysis, or
reporting of information concerning an employee’s activities by
means of . . . electronic observation and supervision . . . which is
conducted by any method other than direct observation by another
201
person . . . .”
The means designed to accomplish this end were
somewhat unique, as the bills proposed a tiered system that tied
acceptable monitoring practices to the tenure of a particular
employee. Recognizing the employer’s interest in conducting a
highly scrutinized trial period of initial employment, the bills allowed
202
random monitoring during an employee’s first sixty days.
Periodic
surveillance of entire work groups was also permissible for limited
203
However, an employer could not randomly
periods of time.
monitor employees with five or more years of tenure, regardless of
204
their position.
Employees could petition for legal or equitable
199

S. 984, 103d Cong. (1993) (introduced by Sen. Paul Simon); H.R. 1900, 103d
Cong. (1993) (introduced by Rep. Pat Williams). Both bills would have applied to
“any individual, corporation, partnership, labor organization, unincorporated
association, or any other legal business, the Federal Government, and any State (or
political subdivision thereof).” S. 984 § 2(4)(B); H.R. 1900 § 2(3)(B).
200
H.R. REP. NO. 103-872, at 45 (1994).
201
S. 984 § 2(2)(A); H.R. 1900 § 2(1)(A). The PCWA also attempted to plug the
holes in workplace privacy protection that resulted from the adoption of the Internet
as a new workplace tool. At the time, some experts believed that the ECPA’s limits
on intercepting electronic communications, see discussion supra notes 144–48, would
not effectively stop employers from monitoring employees’ e-mails because
employers could rely on the exception for messages intercepted “in the ordinary
course of business.” Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act: Hearing on H.R. 1900 Before
the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 103d
Cong. (1993) (testimony of Lewis L. Maltby, American Civil Liberties Union),
available at http://www.workrights.org/issue_electronic/em_testimony_6-30-93.html.
Surprisingly though, the real impediment to extending ECPA’s protections to
employees’ e-mail communications arose from the employers’ ability to store e-mail
messages. According to some courts, employers who read electronically stored
messages have not “intercepted” anything under the ECPA. Nathan Watson, Note,
The Private Workplace and the Proposed “Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act”: Is “Notice”
Enough?, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 79, 82–88 (2001). The PCWA proposed to remedy this
oversight.
202
S. 984 § 5(b)(1); H.R. 1900 § 5(b)(1).
203
S. 984 § 5(b)(2); H.R. 1900 § 5(b)(2).
204
S. 984 § 5(b)(3); H.R. 1900 § 5(b)(3).
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relief from the employer, who also faced potential civil penalties of
205
“not more than $10,000 for each . . . violation.”
The proposed act also included detailed specifications for the
format of the notice employers needed to give to “each employee
who [would] be electronically monitored.” Employers would have
been required to provide prior written notice detailing: (1) “[t]he
forms of electronic monitoring to be used,” (2) “[t]he personal data
to be collected,” (3) “[t]he hours and days per calendar week that
electronic monitoring will occur,” (4) “[t]he use to be made of
personal data collected,” and (5) how the electronic monitoring will
206
The bill waived the notice
be conducted and its results evaluated.
requirement if the employer had a reasonable suspicion that the
employee was violating criminal or civil law or acting adversely to the
207
employer’s interests.
Relevant to prohibiting surveillance of an employee’s after-hours
activities, the PCWA also proposed an absolute ban on the intentional
collection of personal data about an employee, unrelated to the
employee’s work—unless the employee was a customer at the time of
208
Given this provision and others discussed in the
the surveillance.
preceding paragraphs, had the PCWA passed, this Article might have
been unnecessary. Assuming that the definition of “the employee’s
work” was not intended to include the indirect effects that not
sleeping enough or eating poorly after hours might have on an
employee’s performance, the PCWA may have protected employees
209
from an employer’s intrusive look into their personal lives.
However, the PCWA was not meant to be, as “the bill died . . . a
210
Some speculate that the bill’s
‘mysterious death’ in committee.”
defeat stemmed from “the lobbying power behind retail, security, and
restaurant interests” who pitched “electronic surveillance as a loss211
Others suggest that the rigid notice
prevention measure.”
205

H.R. 1900 § 12(a)(1), (c)(1); see also S. 984 § 12(a)(1), (c)(1).
S. 984 § 4(b); H.R. 1900 § 4(b) .
207
S. 984 § 5(c)(1); H.R. 1900 § 5(c)(1).
208
S. 984 § 10(a); H.R. 1900 § 10(a).
209
Some commentators would disagree. Professor Wilborn asserts: “Even if it had
passed, however, the PCWA would not [have been] sufficient. By focusing almost
exclusively on providing employees with notice of employer monitoring, the
proposed PCWA fail[ed] to delineate what types of monitoring [would] be
inappropriate even with adequate notice.” Wilborn, supra note 24, at 851.
210
Corbett, supra note 10, at 115.
211
Karen A. Springer, In God We Trust; All Others Who Enter this Store Are Subject to
Surveillance, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 187, 192 (1995) (citing newspaper accounts of
criticisms from retail and security lobbyists); see also Jennifer J. Laabs, Surveillances:
Tool or Trap?, PERSONNEL J., June 1992, at 96 (describing the various objections that
206
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requirements failed to account for different business needs for
monitoring, something not shared across all industries, and that this
212
Drafters of
weakness caused the bill to fail on its own merits.
federal limitations on after-hours monitoring of employees should
seriously consider these potential obstacles to the PCWA’s passage.
2.

Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act (NEMA)

The similarly ill-fated Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act
213
(“NEMA”) followed the PCWA in 2000.
“[M]ore . . . focused” and
214
NEMA proposed
“less ambitious” than its predecessor,
amendments to Title II of ECPA that would have placed a simple
notice requirement on electronic monitoring of employee
215
Compliance with the act
communication in the workplace.
required annual dissemination of information on the form of
communication or computer usage to be monitored, the means for
and frequency of monitoring, and the information sought and how it
216
would be used.
Although “lean and mean” compared to its
217
“bloated forefather,” the PCWA, NEMA also proposed significant
penalties for employers, including damages recoverable by an
218
individual employee that ranged from $5,000 to $20,000.

industry, labor, and the U.S. Department of Labor had to an earlier version of the
Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, H.R. 1218).
212
Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch Your E-Mail! Employee E-Mail Monitoring and Privacy
Law in the Age of the “Electronic Sweatshop”, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 171 (1994)
(providing an example of how the law failed to account for various business needs
and explaining that “monitoring of all employees for more than two hours per week
may be justifiable and even necessary for polling and survey research organizations
and telemarketing firms”).
213
H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2000).
214
Charles R. Frayer, Comment, Employee Privacy and Internet Monitoring: Balancing
Workers’ Rights and Dignity with Legitimate Management Interests, 57 BUS. LAW. 857, 869
n.86 (2002).
215
Although the act included subtitles describing sections like “Electronic
monitoring in the workplace,” the act only covered an “employer who intentionally,
by any electronic means, reads, listens to, or otherwise monitors any wire
communication, oral communication, or electronic communication of an employee
of the employer, or otherwise monitors the computer usage of an employee of the
employer . . . .” H.R. 4908 § 2(a)(1)(B) (proposing new language for 18 U.S.C. §
2711). Because the radio signals used to pinpoint the location of a GPS tracking
device are likely beyond the definition of “electronic communication of an
employee” intended by the act, the bill did not address every instance of
“[e]lectronic monitoring in the workplace.” Id.
216
Id. (proposing new language for 18 U.S.C. § 2711(b)(1)–(4)).
217
Frayer, supra note 214, at 869.
218
H.R. 4908 § 2(a)(1)(B) (proposing new language for 18 U.S.C. § 2711(d)).
Congress proposed an overall damages cap of $500,000 for a given violation. Id.
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Unlike PCWA, NEMA did not offer substantive employee rights
219
or restrict employers’ abilities to monitor.
These shortcomings led
some to classify the statute as mere “dignity legislation”—not a
220
privacy law.
Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, even accused the law of being
counterproductive for employees, whose reasonable expectation of
221
privacy would be undermined by an employer’s provision of notice.
Others, however, hailed NEMA as “part of the answer to one of the
major concerns of the American public today—the loss of privacy in
222
James Dempsey of the Center for
the face of new technology.”
Democracy and Technology noted that changes in privacy law were
223
long overdue and predicted that the law would make significant
224
contributions to the restoration of worker privacy.
But eventually,
the critics carried the day. In mid-September of 2000, Congress
tabled NEMA because of “concerns [expressed] ‘by various business
and employer coalitions’” regarding “the potential for an ‘increase in
225
employment litigation . . . .’”

219

Watson, supra note 201, at 92–93 (“NEMA’s language does not prohibit
monitoring, but merely requires an employer to give notice before electronic
monitoring occurs.”).
220
Frayer, supra note 214, at 869.
221
Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act: Hearing on H.R. 4908 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Marc
Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center), 2000 WL
1268416 (warning that “an employee’s claims under state common law tort theories
could be undermined because employees would be effectively on notice of the
monitoring practices”). However, as previously noted, even without NEMA and
without notice, most employees have trouble establishing a reasonable expectation of
privacy when using an employer’s property or when exposed to the public eye. See
discussion supra Part III.B.1.b.
222
Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act: Hearing on H.R. 4908 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of James
X. Dempsey, Center for Democracy and Technology) [hereinafter Dempsey
Testimony], 2000 WL 1257244.
223
Id. (“It is sufficient to note that privacy laws underwent their last major update
in 1986 with the enactment of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act—well
before email, cellular phones, and the World Wide Web became the fixtures of
business and personal lives that they are today.”).
224
Id.
225
Frayer, supra note 214, at 871 (citations omitted); see also Notice of Electronic
Monitoring Act: Hearing on H.R. 4908 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Michael Robert Overly),
2000 WL 1268419 (complaining that NEMA’s notice requirements were “unduly
onerous and [would] almost certainly lead to litigation as to whether or not a notice
included sufficient detail”).
Overly called for some form of a verification
requirement, which would demonstrate that an employee had read and understood
the notice and prevent at least some of the predicted unnecessary litigation. Id.
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Congress’ failure to pass the PCWA and NEMA does not bode
well for future efforts to reform worker privacy law through federal
legislation. Employers opposed to new restrictions can more easily
target and lobby federal lawmakers, as opposed to the various state
226
legislatures around the country.
However, a federal law is a
superior option to the patchwork of privacy protection that will
develop if state legislatures are stuck with the task of protecting
employees from intrusive location-based monitoring. Several states
227
This situation should alarm
are already at work on such laws.
employers, who will “run[] the risk of facing different laws in various
jurisdictions and uncertainty regarding which state law may govern
228
particular [situations].”
B. Current State Proposals
Although state efforts to enact some form of workplace privacy
229
law have not fared much better than their federal counterparts, this
230
In their 2003–04
has not discouraged state lawmakers from trying.
sessions, California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and
231
Virginia, among others,
debated some form of an employee
monitoring bill. The California law would have required an
employer to give notice of its intent to collect information on
employee activities.
GPS-enabled devices were not specifically
226

But see Wilborn, supra note 24, at 862 (“Attempted legislative action on the
state level has been repeatedly blocked by company threats to move their business to
a state without the proposed restrictions.”).
227
See discussion infra Part V.B.
228
Wilborn, supra note 24, at 862.
229
See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 10, at 116 (“In 2001, for the third consecutive year,
the California legislature passed an electronic monitoring notice bill, and for the
third time in three years [then-]Democratic Governor Gray Davis vetoed the bill
[because, in his opinion, it] ‘place[d] unnecessary and complicating obligations on
employers.’”).
230
And in some instances, succeeding. Connecticut enacted an employee
electronic monitoring bill (requiring notice only) in 1998. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31–
48(d) (West 2003). The law, however, only addresses “collection of information on
an employer’s premises” and therefore does not encompass the problem of after-hours
monitoring taken up in this article. Id. § 31-48d(3) (emphasis added).
231
According to Lewis Maltby, president of the National Workrights Institute, New
Jersey, Illinois, Minnesota, and Alaska also considered electronic monitoring notice
bills during this period. Darcy, supra note 65. Some of these bills primarily focused
on e-mail monitoring, although the Institute felt the laws might be broad enough to
encompass GPS. Id. In addition, Maryland recently entertained a general electronic
monitoring notice bill. H.B. 686, 419th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2005).
However, a discussion of every bill recently debated is not necessary. The statutes
selected for discussion in the text are sufficiently illustrative of the laws being
proposed, at the state level, to curb GPS tracking of employees.
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mentioned; however, the act broadly applied to the use of “electronic
devices.” The law was strictly a notice statute—employers would have
simply been required to provide a warning that specified the
activities, including those not related to the employer’s business, that
would be monitored and a description of the information sought
232
But after passing both houses, the bill was
through this process.
233
vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger.
Michigan and Pennsylvania’s draft legislation, like NEMA,
specifically targeted monitoring of electronic communications and
contemplated requiring companies to follow detailed notice
234
Virginia’s
provisions before initiating a monitoring program.
235
proposal also relied on the provision of notice.
Of particular
interest was the Massachusetts act, which specifically addressed afterhours surveillance and mirrored many of the provisions in the
defunct PCWA. The act broadly defined “electronic monitoring” to
include any means of collecting information on employee activities
236
Additionally, the act barred
other than direct observation.
collection of information off-site or unrelated to the employee’s
237
work.
This bill probably asked too much of employers, because it
would have prevented them from keeping tabs on their vehicles and
mobile workers during business hours. Employers will not stand for
this. But employers need not worry just yet—all of these ideas have
yet to make it out of committee. Still, they represent tangible
evidence of support for employee privacy protections that federal
laws have failed to provide.
C. Proposal for a New Federal Law
The productivity, efficiency, and quality control arguments that
tipped the scales in favor of employers in other challenges to
232

S.B. 1841, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
California Bill Tracking, S.B. 1841, Reg. Sess., STATENET, Sept. 29, 2004,
http://www.lexis.com (search citation “2003 Bill Tracking CA S.B. 1841”). Note that
this was the same governor who signed into law consumer protections against GPS
tracking just one month before. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
234
S.B. 893, 187th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003); S.B. 675, 92d Legis., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2003).
235
H.B. 1887, 2003 Sess. (Va. 2003).
236
S.B. 2190, 183d Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. § 1(a) (Mass. 2003). Senator Marc
Pacheco recently reintroduced a nearly identical bill. S.B. 1117, 184th Gen. Court,
Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005).
237
S.B. 2190, 183d Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. § 2(a) (Mass. 2003) (“An employer may
use electronic surveillance to collect any information so long as: (i) the information
is collected at the employer’s premises and (ii) the information is confined to the
employee’s work.”).
233
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employee surveillance practices simply do not apply when an
employer seeks to use location tracking systems to unearth
information about an employee’s private life. This activity goes well
beyond the dangers that Congress considered when weighing the
merits of both the PCWA and NEMA. When an employee “sells” her
services to an employer, she does not offer as part of the package an
238
option for the employer to engage in espionage. Because common
law doctrines and existing laws provide inadequate safeguards in this
239
area, a new federal law is required.
A federal law will simply better serve both employers’ and
employees’ interests, as both groups operate in an increasingly
borderless environment.
Because state laws “[differ] across
jurisdictions in their nature and enforcement, [they] lack the
uniformity of federal law. Additionally, state law is ill-suited for
240
regulating a technology which erases state and national borders.”
From the employer side, “a federal statute would make compliance
241
more efficient,” while from the employee side, such a law would
provide a mobile workforce with a clear understanding of their rights,
regardless of location. (This assumes, of course, that ardent lobbyists
will successfully arrange for a drafting that preempts state innovations
242
in this area of the law.)
Specific provisions of the law that will be both effective and
politically palatable are, however, more difficult to define than the
law’s scope. As experience has shown, even modest privacy proposals
243
like the PCWA and NEMA made powerful enemies in both camps.
238

Isajiw, supra note 16, at 94 (“[W]hile a person subordinates herself to her
employer while at work, this subordination extends only to the performance of workrelated activities. The employee sells her services to the employer and nothing
more.”); see also NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., supra note 47, at 19 (“This sort of tracking
seems reminiscent of someone who is in servitude, rather than someone who is being
paid for his work.”).
239
See discussion supra Part III.B; see also Corbett, supra note 10, at 103 (noting
that “electronic monitoring is an area where technology has outstripped the law,
leaving employees largely unprotected”).
240
Kesan, supra note 4, at 301.
241
Wilborn, supra note 24, at 879.
242
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (Copyright Act preemption provision)
(“[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 . . . are governed
exclusively by this title”), with H.R. 1900, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1993) (proposed
PCWA) (“This Act shall not be construed to restrict, limit, or eliminate a
requirement of a State or political subdivision of a State or a collective bargaining
agreement relating to electronic monitoring which is more stringent than any
requirement of this Act.”). See also infra note 260.
243
Corbett, supra note 10, at 137 (“The PCWA and NEMA would have imposed
modest regulations on electronic monitoring of employees, but they were bottled up
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But, if used to prohibit GPS surveillance under limited circumstances,
specifically when the employee is off the clock, many of the same
provisions that failed as part of the PCWA and NEMA may still find
their way into the federal code. The following describes how such a
law might look.
1.

Notice Requirement

First and foremost, employers need to let employees know that
they are under watch. In terms of content, the notice should specify
what location-based tracking devices are installed, where they are
installed, and what they are capable of observing. Additionally, as the
PCWA experience demonstrates, the notice requirement should not
include both a detailed (seven part) individual notice before every
instance of monitoring as well as an all-inclusive general
244
announcement that the employer plans to monitor.
A simple onetime provision of notice, with acknowledgment of the notice signed
by the employee, should suffice. This practice will not only serve to
inform the employee, but it also will provide the employer with some
protection in the event that the employee tries to claim he did not
245
know about the policy.
Moreover, it will take the “guesswork” out
of “[h]ow often, or on what system” an employer monitors its
246
employees.
2.

Technology Requirement

The employer should also either be required to provide
247
employees with a technical and real power to turn off the devices in
order to cloak their off-duty activities, or at least guarantee that any
248
off-duty observations will not be used in employment decisions.
Particularly when devices are not embedded in equipment of
substantial value, the law should favor a system capable of being

in congressional committees by business groups.”); see also supra notes 210–12, 220–
25 and accompanying text.
244
See H.R. 1900 § 4(a)–(b).
245
As noted, the provision of notice is a double-edged sword for the employee
because it deprives him of any claim to a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” See
supra note 221. However, because employees are unlikely to succeed on tort claims
that involve a showing of the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy, supra
Part III.B.1.b, this objection is moot.
246
ORWELL, supra note 1, at 4.
247
Cf. supra note 49.
248
See discussion infra Parts V.C.2, V.C.3.
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turned off—a feature that at least some systems currently offer.
This will minimize the possibility that employers will use the devices
to determine an employee’s extracurricular interests. Workers, like
250
will likely chafe if
the snowplow operators in Massachusetts,
employers use a record of when the GPS device was on and off to
verify hours worked for payroll purposes. However, employee privacy
protection legislation requires a critical balancing of interests as new
technologies emerge that offer legitimate benefits to employers at the
251
Concessions
expense of employees’ imagined right to privacy.
need to come from both sides to make such laws work.
3.

Exceptions Limited to Legitimate Business Interest

If an employer has a legitimate and significant business interest
in monitoring an asset in the employee’s possession after hours, the
new law should allow limited surveillance for the sole purpose of
252
Information about an employee’s legal, offprotecting the asset.
duty activity, incidentally obtained as part of this exception to a
general bar on after-hours monitoring, should not be used to
discipline an employee. The law should prohibit an employer from
expanding the scope of permissible monitoring by fabricating some
attenuated link between the activity observed and the employer’s
253
Some reasonable
amorphous interest in “reputation” or the like.
limits must be placed on snooping. This solution merely provides
non-unionized employees with a sensible protection similar to ones

249

See Track Time with Comet Tracker, http://www.comettracker.com/time.html
(“Workers log in to shifts and breaks using their phone. . . . See which workers are
logged in and ready for work.”).
250
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
251
See Isajiw, supra note 16, at 96.
252
Note that this exception would be designed to allow employers to track the
after-hours whereabouts of big-ticket items such as the company car, but not cheap,
easily replaceable cell phones or other low-cost equipment—items that an employee
would likely agree to replace if lost in exchange for a little privacy.
253
See supra note 90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the business
interests that have justified employers’ investigations of employees after hours. An
example of suitable language for a business-relatedness provision comes from H.B.
2116, 187th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003): “An employer may not [use] data
[collected] on an employee through electronic monitoring which is not relevant to
the employee’s performance.” Id. (emphasis added). Drafters of new legislation could
easily broaden this language to include permission to use data collected to protect
company property. Alternatively, the law could borrow from the PCWA, which
prohibited an employer from “tak[ing] any action against an employee on the basis
of personal data obtained by electronic monitoring of such employee [while the
employee was off-duty.]” H.R. 1900, 103d Cong. (1993) (emphasis added).
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that forward-thinking unions have already secured for their
254
members.
4.

Employee Access to Information

Employers should also provide interested employees with access
to the information collected on their whereabouts. This provision
would alleviate employee anxieties about a monitoring program and
supply an inexpensive enforcement mechanism by empowering those
with the greatest interest in making sure employers comply with the
law with an ability to check for abuses. Providing employees with a
“reasonable opportunity to review all personal data obtained by
255
electronic monitoring of the employee,”
as other electronic
monitoring laws have proposed, would recognize employees’
legitimate fears about how and what information might be used
against them without placing onerous demands on employers, many
of whom are already required under various laws to provide
256
employees with access to their personnel files.
5.

Enforcement Provisions

Finally, the enforcement provisions should be structured to
minimize the burdens placed on employers who, in an unregulated
world, could have enjoyed largely unfettered use of this technology.
Like NEMA, a new law should provide both a floor for damages and a
257
cap on the amount, thus making employers more certain of the
liability they risk if found in violation of the law’s strictures. Similarly,
258
“significant but not onerous,” civil damages and the absence of
criminal penalties would help overcome employers’ fears that this law
254

See, e.g., supra note 85.
H.R. 1900 § 7.
256
See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5(a) (West 2003) (“Every employee has the
right to inspect the personnel records that the employer maintains relating to the
employee’s performance or to any grievance concerning the employee.”); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 631 (2003) (“The employer shall, upon written request from an
employee or former employee, provide the employee, former employee or duly
authorized representative with an opportunity to review and copy the employee’s
personnel file.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 52C (West 2004) (“Any employer
receiving a written request from an employee shall provide the employee with an
opportunity to review his personnel record within five business days of such
request.”). In total, “eighteen states make provision for employees to have access to
their personnel files.” Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Worker’s Privacy:
The United States Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 492 (2002).
257
Recall that “damages under NEMA . . . [had] both a floor of $5,000 and a twotier cap of $20,000 per employee and $500,000 per violation.” Frayer, supra note 214,
at 870; see also H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. § 2(d)(2) (2000).
258
Dempsey Testimony, supra note 222.
255
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will open them up to vast amounts of costly, needless litigation—a
concern that has derailed past efforts to create employee privacy
259
A narrow range of reasonable damages may also facilitate
rights.
settlement and will prevent employees from dreaming up outrageous
260
values for “privacy rights” that they might not have otherwise.
A
conservative statute of limitations, a year or less, for example, could
261
further limit the uncertainty regarding liability.
Administration of the statute, depending on the assigned
agency, could also impact how burdensome employers find new
restrictions. Given the nature of the law, the Department of Labor
(“DOL”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) may be the most obvious choices for the job. However,

259

See supra note 225. Punitive damages, even if capped as they are under Title
VII and the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000), should not be included as this would
defeat the goal to provide employers with a known set of consequences for
monitoring employees after hours.
260
Related to damages, the statute would have to address whether a court can
award additional tort damages for violating a statutory duty. In the context of
employment law, “the workers’ compensation statute expressly excludes private tort
remedies by employees against employers for workplace injury in most situations
[while] statutes like Title VII, since the 1991 Civil Rights Act, expressly create tort
liability.” Drummonds, supra note 115, at 961. Professor Drummonds’ article
provides a cautionary tale of how courts can “create, or refuse to create, new torts out
of statutory duties” when a statute remains silent on the tort remedy. Id. at 995.
261
The statute of limitations for other employment laws is particularly brief. For
example, under Title VII, once the alleged unlawful employment action occurs, an
employee has 180 days to file a charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000). If the
aggrieved party files with a state-sponsored Fair Employment agency in lieu of the
EEOC, the filing period is extended to between 240 and 300 days. Id.; EEOC v.
Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 112–13 (1980); Michael Selmi, The Value
of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 7 & n.24 (1996) (noting that although the law states that the period for a
state filing lasts 300 days, the state is assured a waivable 60-day investigation period
that must conclude before the statute runs).
One remaining area of uncertainty involves attorney’s fees and the costs of
litigation. Because the “significant but not onerous” amount at stake might be less
than the cost of representation, forcing employees to bear the costs of litigation—win
or lose—might discourage them from pursuing justice. Thus, attorney’s fees and
costs should at least be awarded to victorious plaintiffs. However, to limit the flood
of potential lawsuits to the most meritorious claims, and make the law more palatable
for employers, the law might award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, as opposed
to only including them in the package created for a victorious plaintiff. Compare 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000) (allowing “the court, in its discretion, [to grant] the
prevailing party, other than the [EEOC] or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s
fee” in a Title VII case), with 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000) (allowing “[t]he court . . . in
addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, [to grant] a
reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant” in a Fair Labor Standards Act
case), and 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2000) (incorporating into the ADEA, by reference, the
remedies in 29 U.S.C. § 216).
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because of the nature of the technology involved, the law may fit
within the jurisdiction of the FCC. Each agency could have a
legitimate claim to regulate in this field.
If responsibility lands with the DOL, then the agency role might
be limited to rulemaking and optional investigatory activities,
because, consistent with other DOL-administered statutes, plaintiffs
could be allowed to file directly in court (similar to the procedures
for filing the previously discussed tort actions and wrongful discharge
262
263
claims ), without having to secure agency approval first.
In
contrast, the EEOC, responsible for administration of the nation’s
anti-discrimination laws, consistently takes a more active role in
lawsuits. In addition to offering employers guidance on how to
264
the EEOC screens cases and
comply with discrimination laws,
performs initial investigations in an attempt to assess the validity of a
265
claim. When the EEOC determines that cause exists to believe that
the employer has violated the law, it attempts to reconcile the
employer’s and employee’s interests and proceeds to trial if common
266
If, however, the EEOC does not find
ground cannot be reached.
cause, then the aggrieved employee receives a “right to sue” letter
and has ninety days to pursue the case in federal court, without
262

See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1132(1), (3) (2000) (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act); 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (2000) (Family and Medical Leave Act). In several
instances though, statutes administered by the DOL are enforced through
complaints filed with the department rather than plaintiff-initiated lawsuits. See, e.g.,
38 U.S.C. § 4322 (2000) (Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act).
264
Although employers in practice give credence to EEOC guidelines, perhaps
because “good faith reliance on EEOC interpretations is a defense to a Title VII
action,” the EEOC does not have substantive rulemaking authority in all the areas it
oversees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b)(1) (2000); John S. Moot, An Analysis of Judicial
Deference to EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 213, 214 n.8 (1987). While
Congress endowed the EEOC with such power to aid in enforcement of the ADA, see
42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000), and the ADEA, see 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000), it limited the
EEOC’s authority under Title VII to procedural regulations, see Richard A. Bales,
Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 4–5 & n.33 (1999)
(citing 110 CONG. REC. H2575 (statement of Rep. Celler)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5 (2000) (describing the EEOC’s role in enforcing Title VII, which does not include
authority to issue regulations); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1–.93 (2004) (procedural regulations
applicable to Title VII enforcement). Legislators would need to consider which
model to follow if they assigned enforcement responsibilities for the monitoring law
proposed here to the EEOC.
265
Since 1999, the EEOC has also offered an alternative dispute resolution
mediation option that “has been highly successful in resolving charges . . . .” The
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, History of the EEOC Mediation
Program, http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/history.html (Nov. 19, 2003).
266
Selmi, supra note 261, at 9.
263
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267

prejudice.
The process benefits employees who have free access to
the materials collected through the EEOC’s investigatory process if
and when a federal suit becomes necessary. It also might appeal to
employers, who would rather not litigate these matters if possible—
although the process can be intrusive and expensive for them, as they
must comply with EEOC subpoenas and site-visit requests, as well as
expend additional legal fees to defend themselves, first during the
administrative process, and second, in federal court lawsuits.
In creating the EEOC to manage discrimination complaints,
“Congress recognized that the judicial system is not always the most
268
efficient or best medium for resolving employment disputes,” and
the same principle would seem to apply to the after-hours
surveillance law proposed here. Additionally, the EEOC, with its long
history of separating legitimate business needs from pretexts for
discrimination, might be in the best position to identify justifiable
uses of monitoring technology. However, the EEOC has been
characterized as a cumbersome roadblock to the timely resolution of
269
discrimination claims.
Some have also argued that the EEOC
administrative process is impotent, fails to keep employment disputes
out of court, and only adds a wasteful layer of bureaucracy to the
270
Adding another statute to its administrative load
filing process.
may only further stretch its already limited resources.
Alternatively, the FCC already regulates consumer privacy in the
271
telecommunications industry, and both the Automobile Association
of America and the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet
267

Id. For a more detailed discussion of the EEOC’s operating procedures, see
Mary Kathryn Lynch, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Comments on the
Agency and Its Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 20 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89
(1990) and Selmi, supra note 261, at 1–12.
268
Anthony P. Zana, A Pragmatic Approach to EEOC Misconduct: Drawing a Line on
Commission Bad Faith in Title VII Litigation, 73 MISS. L.J. 289, 320 (2003).
269
See generally Selmi, supra note 261.
270
See id. at 10 (“[T]hese procedures amount to a rather strange and vacuous
process—one where thousands of claims are filed at no financial cost to the plaintiff,
few are truly investigated, fewer still resolved, and none of which is binding on any of
the parties.”). Selmi also asserts that “[the EEOC’s] procedures lead to a large
amount of litigation that would be unnecessary in many instances if claims were not
initially processed by the agency.” Id. at 11.
271
See Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 42 U.S.C. § 222
(2000) (placing restrictions on telecommunications carriers’ use or disclosure of
customer proprietary network information (“CPNI”)). But see U.S.W., Inc. v. FCC,
182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (vacating FCC regulations, 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005,
drafted in accordance with § 222, which required that telecommunications carriers
secure affirmative customer permission to use CPNI, as opposed to requiring that
customers opt out of an assumed approval to use CPNI; regulations violated First
Amendment free speech protections).
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Association have asked the FCC to regulate GPS tracking devices.
272
Thus, the FCC may also assume responsibility. Unlike the DOL and
the EEOC, the FCC has experience with implementing laws that limit
how personal information can be collected and used against
273
people. Therefore, the FCC might be in a better position to weigh
the interests of both employers and employees in determining
appropriate limits for the use of GPS surveillance systems in the
context of employment.
As this discussion illustrates, Congress will have to debate the
merits of each agency’s claim to oversee administration of this law.
Given the mix of technology and employment issues present in the
proposed legislation, no one agency clearly trumps the others in its
abilities to execute the statute’s provisions. Additionally, how
Congress reacts to GPS surveillance in other areas might also impact
the suitability of a particular agency. For example, if the FCC
administers a statute dealing with customer privacy protections, an
274
idea proposed in the Location Privacy Protection Act of 2001, then
oversight in the employment context might be a natural extension of
the agency’s responsibilities. Then again, ultimately, this proposal
deals with an employment issue, and the technology used to track
employees today might not fall under the jurisdiction of the FCC of
tomorrow. The appropriate solution is unclear at the time of this
Article’s publication.
D. Responses to Criticisms of the Proposal
Two aspects of this proposal will, admittedly, draw the ire of
several commentators. First, some employment law scholars believe
that, in light of an imagined end to Congressional interest in
employment law, demonstrated by the lack of any new provisions
since 1993, future attempts to legislate in this arena will fail. Second,
272

White, supra note 40, at 14; Petition of the Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Ass’n for a Rulemaking to Establish Fair Location Information Practices,
WT No. 01-72, (FCC Nov. 22, 2000), available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/
ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6512158796 (requesting that the
FCC adopt location information privacy principles under its rulemaking authority
provided by Congress in 42 U.S.C. § 222(f), (h)). Additionally, White notes that the
Location Privacy Protection Act of 2001, see supra note 194, also proposed the FCC as
the appropriate administrative agency to regulate location-based services in the
consumer context. White, supra note 40, at 14; see also S. 1164, 107th Cong. § 2(6)
(2001) (“It is in the public interest that the Federal Communications Commission
establish comprehensive rules to protect the privacy of customers of location-based
services applications . . . .”).
273
See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005 (2005).
274
S. 1164, 107th Cong. § 2(6) (2001).
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some scholars object to the continued piecemeal development of very
specific worker protections.
However, neither critique should
discourage the pursuit of the proposal presented here.
Although failure and backlash from industry have characterized
275
recent attempts to legislate on employment matters, the narrow
scope of a statute providing after-hours protection against employee
surveillance does not threaten employer interests in the same way
that more general restrictions on all employee monitoring did.
Employers objected to the “modest regulations” in the PCWA and
NEMA because the provisions prohibited a broad range of
monitoring activities that infringed on the employers’ ability to run
276
legitimate training and quality assurance programs,
and not
because modern employers were stubbornly aligned in absolute
opposition to any further regulation of the employer-employee
277
During working hours, employers have a variety of
relationship.
business needs that electronic monitoring devices can serve most
efficiently. Indeed, even GPS devices, when used within the limits of
employers’ business interests, have tremendous value as tools to
278
The after-hours protection
improve efficiency in numerous areas.
called for in this Article simply does not tread on similar interests that
employers will be willing to fight tooth and nail to defend.
Likewise, complaints that a law focused only on covert, afterhours surveillance will further fragment the already scattered body of
employment law are without merit. In reality, as the discussion in the
preceding paragraph illustrates, broad worker privacy protections are
not politically feasible. Although, given the effort that will likely go
into its passage, a comprehensive statute establishing workplace
privacy rights would be ideal from the employees’ perspective, if past
275

Corbett, supra note 10, at 96 (warning that “despite the success of past
employment legislation, resorting to this method of regulation too often can
generate significant backlash”). Corbett argues that “[r]egardless of whether an
epoch in employment law history has passed, at this point in time, individual
employment rights legislation is not an appropriate response to these emerging
problems.” Id. at 95. Corbett calls instead for a “retrofit” of the common law to
address a variety of workplace privacy invasions. Id. at 152–61.
276
See Laabs, supra note 211; see also Julie A. Flannagan, Note, Restricting Electronic
Monitoring in the Private Workplace, 43 DUKE L.J. 1256, 1278 (1994) (“[M]onitoring is
an important tool to assist in proper training and to instill adherence to quality and
safety guidelines.”).
277
Contra Corbett, supra note 10, at 134–35 (advising against worker privacy
protections based on legislation because “employers do not like to be regulated, and
they will oppose employment law, particularly legislation, which provides a concrete
target when it is introduced in a legislature”).
278
See discussion supra Part II.C for examples of how GPS tracking systems can
serve legitimate business interests.
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experience is any indicator, employees may just have to settle for
remedying the most egregious intrusions. Additionally, while efforts
should be made to define “electronic surveillance” as broadly as
possible to accommodate new technology, we cannot realistically
foresee every technological development that might be used to
279
The
invade an employee’s after-hours solitude in the future.
immediate concern is to prevent after-hours tracking of employees
using GPS devices. If a more expansive definition of “electronic
surveillance” will rouse employer opposition, then the proposal
should stay focused on the problem at hand and remain open to
280
amendment in the event of future technological changes.
VI. CONCLUSION
GPS surveillance tools pose a new, immediate threat to the
personal autonomy of employees, the likes of which we have not seen
281
before. As we explore the exciting new benefits this technology can
offer, we must also embrace some limits on how employers use it to spy
on employees. Moreover, we cannot delay this endeavor, for
“individuals internalize each incremental step of encroachment, and
thereby lose any sense that privacy was once possible in the
282
encroached upon area.”
Protection must be provided before our

279

See Jill Yung, Comment, Virtual Spaces Formed by Literary Works: Should Copyright or
Property Rights (or Neither) Protect the Functional Integrity and Display of a Website?, 99 NW.
U. L. REV. 495, 507 n.66, 522, 536 (2004) (describing how, despite Congress’ best
efforts to draft a copyright law capable of addressing future technological
advancements, the law has struggled to encompass issues arising in a new forum for
publication: the Internet). But see Wilborn, supra note 24, at 852 (Wilborn warns that
“[a]ny legislation which defines protection in terms of specific types of monitoring
equipment will inevitably be rendered obsolete by newer employee-monitoring
technology falling outside the scope of the legislation. Device-specific privacy
protection legislation enacted by Congress in the past has had only a limited effect in
protecting the privacy rights of private-sector employees.”).
280
Some might argue that new legislation should offer sweeping protections in
case employee rights advocates suffer another winless decade like the one
experienced from 1993 until the present. However, because recent, overly-ambitious
proposals share some of the blame for their own failures, this Article proposes a fairly
narrow solution to an alarming, immediate problem.
281
See LANE, supra note 8, at x (“Employer surveillance tools no longer necessarily
discriminate between work-related and personal activities, and the steady expansion
of workplace surveillance is threatening the privacy of our homes.”).
282
Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 843, 844 (2002). In the context of employment, we have recently
witnessed evidence of internalized encroachments. J.D. Fay, vice president of
corporate affairs for @Road Inc. (a provider of fleet monitoring and other locationbased services), reminds us that “‘[w]hen sales groups were [first] deployed with
pagers [and later, cellphones], they were out in the field thinking . . . “My boss can
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notion of a personal identity, separate from our identity as an
283
employee, fades completely.
Although some might object to yet another law addressing “a
284
particular, narrowly defined invasion,”
because more general
protections against employee monitoring have failed to win approval,
this Article advocates only for a solution to the most egregious form
of employee surveillance: the after-hours location-based tracking of
employees. Such protection represents a realistic attempt to establish
at least some employee privacy protections. My proposal is a small
step, but it is nonetheless a step in the right direction. Moreover, it
would establish the line beyond which employer surveillance clearly
goes too far. This would be a significant accomplishment in a field
that has not seen much of a legislative response to the increasing
threats to worker dignity and autonomy posed by technological
285
Additionally, this proposal recognizes that employers
advances.
have significant and legitimate interests that GPS tracking
technologies can serve. Employees cannot realistically expect the law
to completely disregard the lobbying power behind these interests,
just as employers cannot expect employees to welcome Big Brother
with open arms. As is often the case in the law, balancing these
interests is an essential part of finding an appropriate place for GPS
surveillance technology in the private workplace.
As an aside, even though the law currently poses few obstacles to
the practice, employers should still carefully consider the decision to
track a mobile workforce. Such activities could extend employer
liability not otherwise imputable to the employer. Recall that under

call me at any time and he expects me to call him back!” Now we wouldn’t dream of
working without them’ . . . .” Teicher, supra note 47 (alterations in original).
283
See LANE, supra note 8, at 241 (“The challenge that we face today is not so
much how to protect privacy in the workplace . . . but how to protect the personal
and household privacy of people who are also workers.”); see also 139 CONG. REC.
S6123 (1993) (statement of Sen. Paul Simon in support of S. 984) (“Unless we begin
now to define privacy—and in particular workplace privacy—as a value worth
protecting, . . . new technologies will be upon us before we are ready for them.”).
284
Rod Dixon, With Nowhere to Hide: Workers Are Scrambling for Privacy in the Digital
Age, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, ¶ 48 (Spring 1999), http://grove.ufl.edu/~techlaw/
vol4/issue1/dixon.html (complaining that “[a] number of federal statutes regulate
aspects of employee privacy, but each addresses only a particular, narrowly defined
invasion. For example, separate federal statutes regulate the use of polygraph
testing, credit reports, and medical examinations by employers. Similarly, over half
of the states have statutes regulating the use of polygraphs in employment; at least
fourteen limit employer drug testing plans; and nearly two dozen forbid adverse
employment actions based on off-duty tobacco use. No statute, however, deals with
the issue of employee privacy in a comprehensive way.”).
285
Corbett, supra note 10, at 93.
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the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can incur vicarious
liability for the activities of its employees, and the scope of this
responsibility depends, in part, on the employer’s ability to control
286
the employee’s actions. “[T]he more information an employer has
about its employees’ activities, then the greater the scope of
‘foreseeable’ activity and less likely an employer will be able to argue
that a particular employee was in fact [not acting within the scope of
287
In monitoring for the purpose of reducing
his employment].”
liability, employers who interject themselves into the off-duty
personal activities of employees may inadvertently create a link to
288
these pursuits that spawns more employer liability. Furthermore, in
addition to its effects on liability, employers should also consider the
impact of GPS surveillance on worker morale—which studies show to
289
While the laws do not regulate GPS monitoring
be significant.
practices just yet, social norms and the “creepiness factor” of anything
likened to Big Brother should influence employers’ decisions on
whether to use this technology in the meantime.

286

See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
LANE, supra note 8, at 187.
288
Use of GPS tracking technologies can backfire on employers in other ways as
well. For example, in an unreported decision from the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania, three judges upheld the Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review’s determination that the Township of Lower Frederick owed unemployment
compensation benefits to a security officer who was dismissed when his manually
recorded logs did not match a GPS report on his activities. Twp. of Frederick v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, No. 739 C.D. 2004 *1–2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept.
16, 2004), http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/unpublished/739CD
04_9-16-04.pdf. The township’s draconian policy required officers to log “every stop
of 10 minutes or longer” and when the claimant failed to report some of his longer
investigatory stops, he was terminated. Id. at 2. The court held that negligent
reporting of on-duty activities did not constitute the “willful misconduct” sufficient to
justify denial of an unemployment benefits claim. Id. at *7; see also McMaster v. CocaCola Bottling Co., No. C04-4642MHP, 2005 WL 289982 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2005)
(requesting a refund of a $3 per day “personal use” fee assessed for use of company
vans because employees carried GPS-enabled phones and were arguably on the
clock); NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., supra note 47, at 9 (cautioning that after-hours
monitoring may have financial implications under federal wage and hour laws
because “[u]nder some circumstances, employees who are on call are considered on
duty for purposes of overtime calculation”).
289
See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
287

